

# U.S. POLICY TOWARD NATO ENLARGEMENT

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Y 4. IN 8/16:P 75/2

U.S. Policy Toward NATO Enlargement...

## HEARING BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ONE HUNDRED FOURTH CONGRESS SECOND SESSION

JUNE 20, 1996

Printed for the use of the Committee on International Relations



DEPOSITORY

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# U.S. POLICY TOWARD NATO ENLARGEMENT

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THURSDAY, JUNE 20, 1996

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,  
COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS,  
*Washington, DC.*

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10 a.m. in room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Benjamin A. Gilman (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Chairman GILMAN. The committee will come to order.

We have scheduled this hearing today to review our Nation's policy toward enlargement of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The need to adapt NATO to the post-cold war era is one of the greatest national security challenges that we face. NATO has been widely recognized as the principal instrument by which our Nation and our allies defeated communism and ended the cold war.

But NATO's other major accomplishments are no less important. For almost 50 years now, NATO has successfully kept peace in Europe, while at the same time providing a fertile environment for democracy to take root in such nations as Germany, Italy, Spain, and Turkey.

The emerging democracies of Central and Eastern Europe now look to NATO to do for them what it did for the countries that had the good fortune to be located on the west side of the Iron Curtain when NATO was established back in 1949. These newly free nations seek the same insurance against threats to their independence and the same fertile environment for democracy to take root that NATO has provided to the West for almost 50 years.

The challenge of NATO enlargement was first taken up by President Bush who, in 1992, led the effort to establish a North Atlantic Cooperation Council, the first institutional linkage between NATO and the emerging democracies in Central and Eastern Europe.

President Clinton has gone further, gaining the commitment of our NATO allies in principle to eventual enlargement of the Alliance and establishing the Partnership for Peace, a forum for enhanced military and political cooperation between NATO and potential candidates for membership.

But many of us in the Congress are concerned that the Administration hasn't moved quickly enough and with sufficient enthusiasm for NATO enlargement. The Partnership for Peace, which initially was billed as a bridge to NATO membership, has come to look more like a detour. Congress has sought repeatedly over the last 2 years to spur the Administration to take more immediate action.

The bill I introduced 2 years ago which was enacted as the NATO Participation Act of 1994, authorized our President to provide transition assistance to leading candidates for admission to the Alliance. President Clinton chose not to use that authority, apparently because he didn't want to identify the leading candidates for admission.

So we in Congress acted once again as part of the Contract With America, the House-passed legislation last year, to mandate the establishment of a program to assist the transition to full NATO membership of specified countries in Central and Eastern Europe.

And in a further effort to spur the Administration, last year's Foreign Operations Appropriations Act made technical improvements to the NATO Participation Act and called on the President to designate within 60 days the first countries to receive NATO transition assistance.

Last February, I wrote to the President urging him to comply with that provision. In particular, I recommended that he designate, at a minimum, Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic as eligible to receive NATO transition assistance under the NATO Participation Act.

In response to our committee, in a letter dated May 9, 1996, President Clinton declined to designate any countries. He argued that some countries might be discouraged if they were left off the initial list of designated countries. It is better not to designate anyone if you can't designate everyone, the President seemed to be saying to us.

I can understand that argument, but it is clear to many of us that if NATO expansion has to wait until everyone who wants to come in is ready to come in, we will be waiting for quite a long period of time.

It is obvious to me that the interests of all countries that want to join NATO, are best served by getting the process going now. Some nations will be disappointed that they are not in the first tier of countries admitted to the Alliance, but they still will be better off—and they will get into NATO faster—than they would if the enlargement process remains stalled.

In yet another effort to spur the Administration, former Senator Dole and I introduced bipartisan legislation in early June entitled the NATO Enlargement Facilitation Act of 1996. Former Polish President Lech Walesa joined us in the Capitol to introduce this legislation and formally endorsed our efforts. I am pleased to report that our House bill, H.R. 3564, now has 28 cosponsors, including 11 members of the Minority, and we look forward to marking up that legislation in the committee in the near future. I hope to complete House action on it prior to our August recess.

Before we get to that, however, we have some witnesses here today to share with us their thinking on NATO enlargement. Our first witness is Rudolf Perina, the Senior Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs. Mr. Perina will give us the Administration's perspective, and I hope will tell us where the Administration stands on our bill.

After that, we will have a panel of three experts: Peter Rodman of the Nixon Center for Peace and Freedom; retired General Wil-

liam Odom of the Hudson Institute; and former ambassador to Moscow, Jack Matlock.

Finally, we will have a panel consisting of two representatives of broad-based coalitions of Americans of Central and Eastern European descent. Mr. Frank Koszorus will be speaking on behalf of the Central and East European Coalition and the 18 national grassroots organizations that belong to the coalition, and Richard Kosinski will be speaking on behalf of the National Confederation of American Ethnic Groups and its 11 constituent organizations.

Before turning to our witness, I would ask any of our members if they have any statement.

Mr. Lantos.

Mr. LANTOS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Just a brief observation.

I want to commend you for holding this hearing. I want to welcome all of our witnesses and extend my regret that I have a conflicting hearing going on. I particularly want to commend Ambassador Matlock for his milestone book on the disintegration of the Soviet Union. It will go down as a classic in the literature in our understanding of this extremely complex region.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to make a basic observation concerning NATO enlargement which I think is in line with your thinking. Some of us still remember the genesis of NATO, and from the very outset NATO was a defensive alliance. NATO continues to be a defensive alliance, whether it is enlarged fast or slowly. And if we buy the notion that we cannot enlarge NATO because the Russians will view it as an aggressive move, we buy into the false assumption that was the basis of the Soviet opposition to NATO. NATO has always been and continues to be a defensive alliance, and expanding NATO merely expands a defensive alliance.

Second, Mr. Chairman, I am getting tired of the notion that many of these countries are not yet ready for NATO membership. No parent is ever ready for parenthood, no nation is ever ready for nationhood, and if we wait until Hungary or the Czech Republic or Poland will be fully ready for NATO membership, we will wait forever. We have to have rational yardsticks, and we have to establish reasonable criteria for these countries to enter.

It is also extremely important to realize that those of us who are passionately committed to political democracy and the defense of human rights in all of these countries, which are in many cases a long ways from being secure, we must realize that accession to NATO means the strengthening of the democratic forces, that accession to NATO means that these countries will accelerate their internal process of democratization; respect for the media, which is certainly not present in many of these countries; respect for religious freedom, for human rights, and particularly for ethnic minorities. The outrageous thing, for instance, which happened in the recent Albanian elections could never take place in a country which is a NATO member.

Therefore, I commend you, Mr. Chairman, for your vigorous pushing for NATO enlargement. As you indicated, a number of us on the Democratic side are fully in support of this. I wish you would refer to us as the Democrats, rather than the Minority, because while we remain Democrats, minority is a fleeting status.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GILMAN. Well, thank you for your observation and for your kind support of our measure.

Mr. Bereuter.

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would tell my friend from California that sometimes minority status can last as long as 40 years, as we could attest.

Mr. Chairman, I want to commend you for the introduction of the legislation and for this hearing. It has been a pleasure to work with you and key members of our staff, and indeed, there has been bipartisanship to craft the legislation, so I am pleased to be an original cosponsor with you.

I think it is important to emphasize, concerning the legislation that we are not creating new lines across Europe, we are not creating provocative no-man's land areas in the various countries of Eastern and Central Europe.

But I do think that as we look toward evolution from PFP, Partnerships For Peace, kind of status to full membership in NATO, what we are doing can give additional stimulus to participatory democracy, toward pluralism, toward civilian control of the military, and indeed toward transparency in the military budget, elements that obviously the 16 NATO countries will look for as they consider new membership.

So I look forward to hearing from our witnesses, and thank you for holding the hearing.

Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Bereuter.

Are there any other opening statements?

Mr. HASTINGS. Mr. Chairman, I will be very brief. Having had the good fortune to visit this area of concern, the Czech Republic and Hungary more specifically, I left there fully supportive of expanding NATO and just want to go on record as saying that at least in regard to Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary, we should be as expeditious in our efforts in supporting the expansion.

One of the reasons, put simply, would have to do with the events unfolding in Russia today. If by chance Russia were to become a Communist country fully again, I am curious as to what our policy-makers think would happen to these areas; indeed, what would happen to Slovenia and the Baltics if that were to occur.

All of the officials in Hungary, all of the officials in the Czech Republic, with whom Howard Berman and others and I met were crying out for an opportunity to be full-fledged partners in NATO. I would like to associate myself with the remarks of Mr. Lantos that were made when I came in here. If we continue to wait, then we could wait forever.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing.

Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Hastings.

Chairman GILMAN. And now our first witness, Rudolf Perina, Senior Deputy Assistant Secretary of State.

Mr. Perina, you may make your full statement or summarize it, whichever you deem appropriate. Please proceed.

**STATEMENT OF RUDOLF V. PERINA, SENIOR DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF EUROPEAN AND CANADIAN AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE**

Mr. PERINA. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, I welcome very much this opportunity to appear before your committee to describe the progress we have made toward strengthening NATO.

I would like to enter my written statement in the record and briefly summarize it for you orally.

Chairman GILMAN. Without objection.

Mr. PERINA. Thank you.

NATO remains the foundation of American policy in Europe. It is the essential organization for peace on the continent. Two weeks ago in Berlin, Secretary Christopher and his Alliance counterparts approved a sweeping new program to deal with the challenges of the new era.

NATO is adapting internally. It is assuming new roles and missions, and it is projecting its strength outward, both through innovative programs such as the Partnership For Peace and by taking in new members. Viewed together, this truly constitutes a new NATO which will serve a broad range of American political and security interests well into the next century.

An essential aspect of the new NATO is the welcoming of new members into the Alliance. I am aware, Mr. Chairman, of your considerable personal efforts in support of our policy on NATO enlargement, and I greatly value your views on how to achieve our mutual objective. Working in cooperation with you and the U.S. Congress, with our allies and their parliaments, and with the prospective new members themselves, we can and will accomplish this historic feat.

The Administration welcomes the efforts you have led to build bipartisan support for the President's policy of enlargement. The legislation which you recently cosponsored represents a significant opportunity to build congressional support for enlargement. Indeed, we believe our objective should be to come up with a bill which wins the support of large majorities in both Houses and, in particular, at least 67 votes in the Senate, and we look forward to working with you toward this end.

Our basic policy, as set forth by President Clinton in a recent letter to you, Mr. Chairman, is that by taking in new members from among Europe's new democracies, NATO can help lock in the very substantial progress these states have made in instituting political and economic reforms. NATO's enlargement will serve to erase the illegitimate lines drawn during the cold war.

At this Administration's initiative, NATO began a process in January 1994 that will result—I repeat, that will result—in the admission of new members to the Alliance.

We have moved smoothly from definition of the why and how of enlargement to a second phase of detailed examination of the candidacies of 15 countries. We have done so in a manner which reflects the very substantial security commitments and the many practical preparations necessarily involved in admitting new members to NATO, and, on the basis of our work within the Alliance and the recently concluded Berlin NATO ministerial, we have a clear sense of the way ahead.

Before reviewing our overall strategy for enlarging NATO, I want to update you and the committee on where the enlargement process now stands.

The enlargement process was launched at the January 1994 NATO summit. At President Clinton's personal urging, NATO leaders also launched another U.S. initiative, the Partnership For Peace, whose dual objective is to help prepare our new PFP partners for possible NATO membership while at the same time creating a long-term mechanism for linking the Alliance to those states which might not join NATO early or at all.

Given the success of the PFP program, by December 1994, again at U.S. initiative, NATO foreign ministers were able to take a decision to move the enlargement process a step further by launching a detailed study of NATO enlargement.

Last fall, precisely on schedule, NATO completed this study of the rationale and mechanisms for enlargement. The study was welcomed by our partners, who recognized it as a significant step forward in the enlargement process.

In December 1995, NATO agreed to move into the second phase of the enlargement process. This current phase consists of intensified preparations by both NATO and aspiring members for assuming the rights and fulfilling the obligations of NATO membership.

The individual consultations between allies and partners on enlargement are addressing the full range of political, military, and financial issues entailed in membership in NATO. Fifteen partners are thus far participating in this phase of intensified preparation. Allies have agreed that this phase of the enlargement process will run through most of this year and that our foreign ministers will determine next steps at their December 1996 ministerial meeting in Brussels.

Decisions will have to be made by the Alliance as a whole, but this Administration's approach to the December meeting is clear. As Secretary Christopher recently told his Central European counterparts in Prague, NATO will decide on next steps in December of this year. This message was reinforced at the June 3 Berlin ministerial, where foreign ministers restated their commitment to take the next steps in the NATO enlargement process in December. Secretary General Solana has predicted that accession talks with the first group of prospective new members will begin next year.

Throughout this process, the Administration has been pursuing a comprehensive strategy to ensure that enlargement succeeds. The first element for success lies in building and maintaining a durable Alliance consensus in support of steady progress toward enlargement. Admission of any new members to NATO must have the full support of all of its current members; it cannot be a unilateral effort.

Our success to date is directly attributable to our ability to link progress on enlargement with the individual views and interests of our allies, most of whom will face a parliamentary ratification process similar to our own.

A second element in our comprehensive strategy is to place NATO enlargement in the context of a broad, balanced, and integrated approach to increasing stability and security throughout the transatlantic area by building a cooperative security structure in Europe. This includes a revitalized NATO, which we achieved in Berlin, thus laying a necessary foundation for further steps on enlargement. It also includes support for enlargement of the Euro-

pean Union, strengthening the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, a strong and productive relationship between the Alliance and Russia, and enhanced cooperation with other states not immediately aspiring to NATO membership.

In this regard, we are engaged in a continuous dialog with Moscow on the full range of European security issues, including NATO enlargement, but only the Alliance will determine the pace and direction of enlargement.

Just 2 weeks ago in Berlin, Foreign Minister Primakov met with Secretary Christopher and his Alliance counterparts as part of our ongoing "16 plus 1" dialog with Russia. Our goal is to build on the solid cooperation between NATO forces and Russia currently taking place on the ground in Bosnia.

Russia has an important role to play in the new Europe. As Secretary Christopher has said, the door to European integration is open to Moscow, but it is up to Russia to decide to step through it. At this point, however, let me state definitively: our comprehensive approach to enlargement does not—I repeat, does not—include any sort of secret deal with the Russians, period.

A third critical element for the success of our strategy is encouraging prospective members to prepare seriously for the full range of political, military, and financial responsibilities they will need to assume if and when they become members. Admission to NATO is a solemn undertaking for both NATO and aspiring members, involving the most serious commitments nations can undertake, the obligation to defend each other. Aspiring allies need to prepare for these and other obligations.

Finally, and to their great credit, let me emphasize, Mr. Chairman, that partners have not waited to be identified before undertaking the basic reforms and preparations for enlargement. The prospect of NATO membership has proven to be the most powerful incentive for reform and resolution of ethnic or territorial conflict that we can offer to aspiring members.

For example, recent improvements in civilian control of the military in Poland and in relations between Hungary and its neighbors are in large part attributable to those countries' desire to join NATO.

We firmly believe that our comprehensive strategy is the best means for carrying NATO's enlargement process through to a successful conclusion. Each of the three elements of our approach complements the others, and each is helping us to erase the cold war lines of confrontation that divided Europe. Only in this way can we take new members into our Alliance without redrawing these lines. Proof that our strategy is working can be seen in the already significant improvement in the ability of partner forces to undertake joint missions with NATO.

In Bosnia, for example, 12 partner states are working alongside NATO forces in IFOR, and they are doing a superb job. Romanian troops, for example, are engaged in the very necessary, but also very dangerous, task of clearing land mines.

To conclude, Mr. Chairman, this Administration is absolutely committed to continued close cooperation with you and the rest of the Congress to ensure that our partners have every opportunity to become members of NATO. We welcome your efforts to build

solid bipartisan congressional support for both the continuing engagement of the United States in Europe and for this Administration's commitment to bringing new members into the Alliance.

As Secretary Christopher said during his March visit to Prague, we are determined to keep faith with the nations of this region, to open the door that Stalin shut when he said no to the Marshall Plan. No nation in Europe should ever again be consigned to a buffer zone between great powers or relegated to another nation's sphere of influence.

Mr. Chairman, we look forward to continuing to work closely with you, your congressional colleagues, and your staffs as we move forward together in the historic task of adding new members to the Alliance.

Thank you very much. I would now be happy to answer any questions that you or other members may have.

Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Perina.

From your testimony, am I to understand that the Administration generally supports the bill that we have introduced on NATO enlargement, H.R. 3564?

Mr. PERINA. Mr. Chairman, we think that this bill is much improved over some previous versions of the bill. We welcome the bill. There are still some differences which we would have. They are not, I would submit, significant differences. I think they could be worked out fairly easily on a staff level perhaps, and we would look forward to doing that with you.

Chairman GILMAN. Well, we will look forward to working with you.

Could you tell me, with regard to the bill's designation of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic as eligible to receive transition assistance while allowing the President to designate additional countries that could meet the requisite criteria, do you have any problem with designating those nations?

Mr. PERINA. Mr. Chairman, we would still prefer not to designate specific countries by name. The position which you outlined in your opening statement still holds on our part. We still believe that it would be wiser not to name specific countries. This might prove discouraging for some applicants; it might lead to complacency with other applicants. But we would not see this as an essential part of your bill from our perspective.

Chairman GILMAN. Well, Mr. Perina, won't we be facing the same problem with the designation at the ministerial meeting in Brussels where, according to your testimony, a decision on which countries to admit to NATO is going to have to be made? Would it also be premature in December to differentiate countries?

Mr. PERINA. Well, we are now, Mr. Chairman, engaged in what I described as the second phase of our process of NATO enlargement where we are having very serious, intensified discussions with 15 potential partners, and we believe that this phase will be concluded by December, and we would like to conclude this phase before deciding upon the next steps in the enlargement process.

I cannot tell you, and I would just like to clear up any misunderstanding, I did not mean to imply from my testimony that, in fact, countries invited to accession negotiations will be named in Decem-

ber. I cannot make that commitment. This will be a decision for foreign ministers to make in December.

I do believe, however, that significant decisions which move the enlargement process forward will be made in December. Perhaps this will include names; perhaps it will not. I really am not in the position to make that prediction at this time.

Chairman GILMAN. Well, if we don't designate by December some of the eligible countries, when would you anticipate we would be able to do that?

Mr. PERINA. Well, I would say, I mentioned in my statement that Secretary General Solana has predicted that accession negotiations with potential members will begin next year. We see an emerging consensus within NATO among current NATO members toward such a time plan. However, there has been no formal decision on this. Such a decision can only be made by ministers, so it would be inappropriate of me to give you a firm commitment on this. I cannot do that.

However, Secretary General Solana has made this prediction, and we would not argue with this prediction. We see it as a fairly, perhaps reasonable prediction.

Chairman GILMAN. Well, I think what you are saying to us is that there is a possibility that there would be a delay beyond the December NATO ministerial meeting in Brussels and that it is possible there wouldn't be any firm decisions at that meeting. Is that right?

Mr. PERINA. No. I believe there will be decisions, Mr. Chairman. I just don't know if these decisions will include specifically in December the naming of names.

Chairman GILMAN. That is what I was referring to.

Mr. PERINA. Yes. But I think there will be significant decisions which bring the process forward, and I believe we will see significant progress.

Chairman GILMAN. Well, can you tell us what, if anything, the Administration is going to do to make certain that the necessary decisions on NATO enlargement are not going to be unduly delayed or postponed?

Mr. PERINA. Well, we are working continually with our allies on this. Most of the decisions which have been made so far and the milestones which have been achieved in this process have been due to U.S. leadership, and most of the milestones which have occurred have indeed occurred on time.

The NATO enlargement study was completed as we hoped, and it was anticipated that we would have the second phase, which I would submit is a very important phase in terms of the overall strategy on enlargement, and it is anticipated that the second phase will end in December, and I believe it will. And this will open up the road to significant next decisions.

Chairman GILMAN. Mr. Perina, I take it you can't predict what will come out of that ministerial meeting, but what will our Nation's position be? Will we specifically recommend Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic to be the first tier of countries admitted? Are we going to advocate that?

Mr. PERINA. There has been thus far no decision within the Administration on which countries would be the first candidates for NATO membership.

Chairman GILMAN. Are we considering any other countries in the first tier of countries to be admitted to NATO?

Mr. PERINA. We are engaged in this process of a dialog with all 15 countries who have expressed interest in this dialog, and I think we are waiting for completion of these intensified discussions, and then we will evaluate the result of all of these.

Chairman GILMAN. Mr. Perina, what will be your target date for admission of countries to the Alliance?

Mr. PERINA. Mr. Chairman, there is no target date to this process, but we wish to carry it forward at the proper speed within the context of our overall strategy.

Chairman GILMAN. And what do you consider to be proper speed? Is there some parameter?

Mr. PERINA. Not too fast and not too slow.

Chairman GILMAN. Thank you for your very astute response.

Mr. Hamilton.

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Perina, let's assume the Gilman bill is passed by the Congress. Would the President sign it or veto it?

Mr. PERINA. In its present form?

Mr. HAMILTON. Yes.

Mr. PERINA. Congressman, with all due respect, I cannot speak on behalf of the President here. I do not know.

Mr. HAMILTON. Well, you have me pretty mixed up. I mean, you welcome the bill, but the heart of the bill is to pick three countries out and put them at the head of the list, and you seem to reject that.

Mr. PERINA. Well, if that would be the interpretation as being the heart of the bill, we indeed would have a problem with that at this particular time.

Mr. HAMILTON. All right. Let me ask you, when we talk about NATO enlargement, we usually make the case for it on the basis of NATO needing to expand to keep its relevance, that it is necessary to preserve the security of the Newly Independent States, and other rationales. And you have an interesting phrase at the top of page 2 of your statement in which you said, "NATO enlargement means a more secure United States." Spell that out for me. Why does it make the United States more secure to enlarge NATO?

Mr. PERINA. Well, we believe—

Mr. HAMILTON. What specifically?

Mr. PERINA. Yes. We believe it will make the United States more secure because it will enhance European security and European stability, which is inherently in our interests and a very high objective which we have.

But in order to achieve this, in order to make the process of NATO enlargement a stabilizing factor rather than a destabilizing factor, it has to be carried out within the context of a larger strategy, which I tried to describe within my statement, which is also a parallel development of other European security institutions, assuring that there is a solid alliance consensus on behalf of enlargement, and preparing the new members themselves for enlargement.

Part of the enhanced security comes from the transformation, from the process itself, as these members prepare themselves for membership.

Mr. HAMILTON. Now, the heart of this is—as you put it in your statement—the obligation to defend each other. What the United States is doing here, then, is, we are taking on the obligation. And let's be clear about it; we are the ones that have the military power; we are taking on the obligation to defend, how many, 15 or 16 other countries; right?

Mr. PERINA. Yes.

Mr. HAMILTON. And that means—in the event of a threat to the security of any of those countries, we are going to commit American nuclear power, American forces to go to war; right?

Mr. PERINA. That is the collective defense of NATO as it currently is, yes.

Mr. HAMILTON. Now, we are not talking here about classification of NATO members, are we? I mean, there are no second-class members in this enlargement process?

Mr. PERINA. No, sir.

Mr. HAMILTON. That means then that we are going to put the nuclear deterrent at the disposal of these countries if their national security is jeopardized; is that correct?

Mr. PERINA. Well, at the disposal of the countries. They will be part of—

Mr. HAMILTON. We put the nuclear guarantee under article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty available, correct?

Mr. PERINA. To full members of the Alliance; yes, sir.

Mr. HAMILTON. Now, does that mean we are going to be putting American troops into all of these countries, or some of them?

Mr. PERINA. No, not at all. The NATO enlargement study which was issued in September 1995 said that, according to our military planning, the alliance military planning, there is at this time no a priori requirement evident for either stationing NATO troops or NATO nuclear forces on the territory of new members. That is, I would stress, under present circumstances, but we do not see that as changing in the foreseeable future.

Mr. HAMILTON. But that means that we reserve the right to station nuclear forces on their territory, does it not?

Mr. PERINA. We would reserve that right, yes, sir; but we would not plan to do so in the foreseeable future under present circumstances.

Mr. HAMILTON. Now, of course, we are cutting back American forces dramatically in Europe. We used to have 300,000. Now I think we are either approaching or near 100,000. Most of the defense budgets in Central Europe are being cut back. But under enlargement, we are expanding dramatically our commitments and our obligations and our responsibilities, while at the same time we and others are dramatically cutting back resources, capabilities. Why does that make sense?

Mr. PERINA. Well, what we are doing is revitalizing NATO, Congressman. We are changing NATO. We are trying to adapt it to be responsive to the new post-cold war era, which offers different challenges from those in past decades. We see that there is a critical need for NATO under certain circumstances. We see that in Bosnia

today, where NATO is engaged in the largest military operation in its history.

I think what we are seeing is really the adaptation of NATO, and enlargement is part of this adaptation. There is an internal adaptation going on, an external one, which includes NATO enlargement, and an adjustment to dealing with new tasks. I think all of the European institutions are, to one degree or another, engaged in such a process of transformation.

Mr. HAMILTON. What do you estimate the cost to be to the United States of taking on the obligations of defending these 15 or 16 additional countries?

Mr. PERINA. Congressman, that is a very fair and a very legitimate question, and, believe me, I wish I could answer it for you and for myself also. The reality is that this question is very, very difficult to answer. It is difficult to answer because we do not know certain key facts. We do not know who the new members will be, and we do not know the security environment which will exist when those new members—

Mr. HAMILTON. But you take on the obligations not knowing what the cost is.

Mr. PERINA. Well, the whole process of taking on obligations will be done in close cooperation with the Congress and with your committee. It is not something that will happen overnight, and I venture to say that when the time comes that we can name names and we can begin accession negotiations—

Mr. HAMILTON. Have you seen the CBO study?

Mr. PERINA. I have seen a GAO study, and I have seen a Rand study.

Mr. HAMILTON. There is a CBO study that projects the costs of bringing in four countries, the three that are in the Gilman bill, plus Slovakia, at \$60 billion to \$124 billion over a 15-year period. The United States is going to be paying somewhere from \$300 million to \$1.2 or \$1.26 billion dollars per year for this enlargement.

Mr. PERINA. I would question the reliability of those figures, because—

Mr. HAMILTON. Well, look, we all understand these figures can't be very precise, but, on the other hand, you are very firm in your commitment here to enlarge, you are very vague about costs, and it always seems to me that one of the principles of a sound, effective foreign policy is to make sure that you have the capability to achieve your objectives.

Mr. PERINA. Well, I—

Mr. HAMILTON. I know. Let me ask you another question.

Mr. Chairman, I appreciate your indulgence here.

You have spoken several times about an emerging consensus among the NATO allies. I must say, we have a lot of visitors coming through this place from Europe, and my distinct impression from several of those allies is that they are very lukewarm about this business of enlargement, and I am not sure I would describe that as an emerging consensus. My impression is, for example, that Chancellor Kohl, who once, I believe, was a proponent of enlargement, is much more lukewarm about it today.

So I am unclear on how you define an emerging consensus. What do you mean by that? Do you mean that all of the parties are now

on board in support of the enlargement of NATO? Does it mean that all of them are on board with support of these three countries?

Mr. PERINA. I apologize, Congressman. It is a confusing term which is used in NATO circles. It means that there appears to be no one who would dispute this, such a statement, although there has not been a formal decision taken which would make it a definitive fact.

Let me comment, if I may, on your point about funding. This is, of course—we recognize the importance of funding in all of these matters. It is one of our—one of the points that we would deal with in the legislation, that we would point out with regard to the legislation which I was discussing with the chairman, is that we would like to see perhaps more solid funding, more solid authorization of funding within this bill for the process of helping potential partners get ready for NATO membership.

So we recognize that funding is a key issue, but we think that within this process of enlargement, which will proceed over the next year, that we will have ample opportunity to consult with you and with other Members of Congress on the potential costs.

Mr. HAMILTON. Well, let me just observe, I know my questions here have been skeptical of enlargement, and maybe I have overstated that to some extent, but I must say that what strikes me about this issue of enlargement is that in the Washington community and maybe in the diplomatic world in which you operate, there is kind of an assumption about NATO enlargement being good.

My observation is that among the American people, or at least those American people I represent, they don't know anything about NATO enlargement. They don't know what it means, and they certainly don't understand the additional responsibilities and obligations that we in this country are going to take on.

Do I want to send young men and women to die to protect the border of Slovakia or the Czech Republic? That is really what the question comes down to. That is what NATO enlargement means. Do we want to spend an extra \$1 billion per year on defense for NATO enlargement? Do we want to bring in Poland and Hungary, but exclude the Baltics? That is what it means. And I don't think we have sorted through all of that. And your statements with regard to NATO and Russia don't give me a lot of confidence either.

Now, maybe this is working out, but the conversations we have had with the Russians up to this point—and I recognize Ambassador Matlock is going to be testifying later on, and we will want to ask him about this—lead me to think that this is a very sensitive matter for them.

We can say that we are not going to divide Europe, but if you bring other members into NATO and leave other countries out, what is it but a division? And how does it affect those nations that are left out?

You can see I am trying to sort through a lot of these very tough issues, and therefore I am asking you some fairly difficult questions. I appreciate your willingness to respond to them.

But I think that we in this country have to do an awful lot more thinking about what enlargement means. I know what it means. I understand what it means for Poland and Hungary and the Czech

Republic. But what does it mean for us in terms of the obligations we are taking on?

At the end of the day you have to get 67 votes in the Senate for every single country, as I understand it, that is brought in. Is that not correct?

Mr. PERINA. Yes.

Mr. HAMILTON. And not only us, but all the other countries of NATO likewise have to approve.

Well, we have a lot of questions. I appreciate your testimony. I want to thank the chairman, because I think he has certainly, as you said in your statement, advanced the consideration of this, and we ought to be looking into it very seriously.

Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Hamilton.

Mr. Bereuter.

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Our distinguished colleague from Indiana is raising important questions and reminding us that this is an expansion that does have costs. It certainly has expanded costs and commitments that must be made by the countries that hope to be a part of NATO.

I do think that the American people certainly would have had concerns about sending American troops to defend the Norwegian-Soviet border or a German border or Italian border or a Turkish border over a period of time, but gradually we have come to accept that it is in our national interests to defend those borders. Likewise, I think that with proper explanation, the American people reach the same conclusion about a different tier of border if, in fact, these countries meet the commitments and are brought into NATO.

Now, Secretary Perina, I do think that you have given a fairly positive reading to the legislation before us. I wrote down your comments. And I think that is understandable. If there is a lukewarmness, as my colleague suggests, about NATO expansion among our NATO allies, it may well be because they expect us to take the lead, and I think Congress is providing a service to the executive branch, as well as the American people, by specifying three countries, not that we are asking to be brought into NATO, but which would become eligible for what we call NATO enlargement assistance funds, and that is expected then to be, including those three countries at least in the first tier of countries that would be brought into NATO.

I think, therefore, it is interesting that, as I visited with foreign ministers or defense ministers from practically every one of the 15 countries now over the period of the last year, there is no discussion which suggests that these three countries that we have identified for first-rung assistance are inappropriately placed in that category.

The concern has been, when it is expressed, that there are other countries that are left off that are not mentioned in that first tier. As you suggest, naming names would be discouraging other countries or providing a sense of complacency.

I think in some cases it provides a wake-up call to countries, because, almost without exception, parliamentarians from the 16 NATO countries are concerned, for example, about the deterioration of democracy and democratic institutions in Slovakia, and that ought to be a wake-up call to what is happening there.

In fact, I think it is a stimulus, or an insensitization, for these countries to move ahead with the necessary kind of criteria, even unspecified, for NATO membership. I see no apparent opposition among our colleagues in the North Atlantic Assembly, the other 15 NATO countries, when we discuss early membership for these three countries, and, in fact, the discussion then goes on, well, who else should logically be brought in?

Now, the Rand data indicates that the cost might be, conservatively speaking, \$10 billion to \$50 billion over a 10-year period of time for the countries involved and for the 16 NATO countries, and the high and low range for the CBO estimate is \$4.8 billion to \$18.9 billion for the U.S. involvement over a period of time. So there are costs, there is no doubt about it. There are costs to maintaining NATO, regardless of what its borders are.

I would like just to ask you one question. Has the Administration made any commitments at all to the Russians about NATO enlargement? What question, if any, can you specify?

Before you to answer that, I need to say one more thing. I think any discussion in the Congress or outside about stationing nuclear forces, tactical nuclear weapons or otherwise, on these new countries is a moot point, a moot question. Weapon modernization has moved beyond the point that we need to do that, so this is really not an issue that ought to be on the table.

Secretary PERINA, may I restate my question to you and invite you to answer: What kind of commitments, if any, we have made to the Russians over NATO enlargement, and what additional ones you might contemplate?

Mr. PERINA. Congressman, we have made no commitments, as such, to Russia on NATO enlargement. However, recognizing that this is a sensitive point, that it is a matter of concern to Russia, we have kept Russia informed of what the Alliance is doing.

This is, after all, a transparent process, and we have sought to reassure them that this is not something which is directed against Russia, and we have tried to convince them that ultimately the process of NATO enlargement is as much in their interest as it is in our interest or in the interest of other European countries, because we believe it will be a stabilizing force and enhance European security.

Mr. BEREUTER. Do you regard anything that has happened in the last few days as favorable reaction from Russian leaders, from Yeltsin and others? Post-Russian election?

Mr. PERINA. Post-Russian election. Well, the Russian election is, of course, a very important event for Russia, but it would—regardless of the outcome in the Russian election, it would not influence the process of NATO enlargement.

Mr. BEREUTER. Good. I am glad to have that reassurance.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Bereuter.

Mr. Johnston.

Mr. JOHNSTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, I am probably one of the few people who is very much against expansion of NATO. In your response to Congressman Hamilton, you said our security would be enhanced because it would enhance European security.

You are dealing with 16 countries, two of which are part of the old Yugoslavian empire, and two that are part of the CIS, Ukraine and Azerbaijan. You also have the Baltic countries. You have got huge expense here. As was pointed out, you said you had looked at those figures.

Mr. Hamilton quoted CBO. The Rand figures project our costs between \$400 million to \$2.5 billion a year for the next 10 years. That is for four countries.

Have GAO or the Administration done any projections on what it would cost if we took in seven countries? We might as well face it, we are going to be underwriting this to a large extent.

I have great respect for Mr. Bereuter, and he said that the United States—and I quote him—“will accept the defense of these borders”. I don’t think Bosnia was a good testimonial for that, and the fact that there was so much controversy within this Congress about our going into Bosnia. We learned from Bosnia that the Europeans can’t defend themselves.

General Scowcroft mentioned that after Desert Storm they went to Europe and said, “Do you need any help in Yugoslavia?” The Europeans said, “This is a European problem and we will resolve it, and stay out of it,” and then they came back to us and said, “You have to bail us out of this thing.”

Mr. JOHNSTON. So I guess my question is, No. 1, have you estimated the tremendous cost involved here? No. 2, have you estimated the tremendous risk that you are putting the United States at when you give such hypotheticals as Kaliningrad? If the Germans have a border dispute with that, then do we go to war against Russia? Have you considered the marginalization of Russia and what it is going to do to them by taking in 16 countries possibly that surround it almost on its western border?

So to go back to the original observation that this enhances our security, does NATO and does the United States really need these additional conflicts between these alliances and the fact that we are going to have to bail them out?

Mr. PERINA. Thank you.

Well, on the issue of the estimated costs, again, we have looked at this and found it is really impossible, without knowing which countries we are looking at and without knowing the security context, the security environment that will exist; it is very difficult to make any sort of reliable estimates.

I know the high end of the Rand estimates, for example, presumes that the equivalent of the West German border during the height of the cold war will be recreated on some other border. This is not something which we foresee at this time, although of course it is a possibility, we hope not one that will materialize.

It is very difficult to make these estimates that, overall, under the conditions of the NATO enlargement study which postulated that there is no a priori need for forward stationing of NATO forces on the territory of new members or of nuclear weapons. We believe that, in fact, the costs of enlargement would be on the low end of most of these studies under present circumstances, rather than on the high end.

Mr. JOHNSTON. Who is we?

Mr. PERINA. We, the Administration.

Mr. JOHNSTON. OK. So GAO and OMB have made projections.

Mr. PERINA. GAO?

Mr. JOHNSTON. Yes. You said—earlier you said GAO—

Mr. PERINA. There a GAO study.

Mr. JOHNSTON. What were those figures?

Mr. PERINA. I have to look them up. I know we believed the specific figures were not reliable.

Mr. JOHNSTON. So CBO, GAO, and Rand are all not reliable on their projected figures.

Mr. PERINA. I think what I am saying is that there have been figures which have come out on the high end, for example, of the Rand study which we believe are far higher than realistically one would expect. I think those figures on the high end of the Rand study were like \$100 billion over the next 10 to 15 years.

We do not, under the present circumstances, believe that it would be at all in that ball park. We believe, rather, it would be closer to the other end of the spectrum. But we are very reluctant to endorse specific figures because we really believe it is unreliable.

If I might comment on your other questions, I think your comments and your questions seem to assume that all 15 candidates who are now engaged in discussions with NATO would become members in the near future. I don't think anybody realistically anticipates that that would happen.

We do see enlargement as a process which will continue over perhaps a rather extended period, and there will be some countries that get in before other countries, and of course a number of the factors which you mentioned—commitment to democratic principles, resolution of minority problems, commitment to the rule of law, to civilian control of the military, that will be taken into account when we evaluate candidates.

NATO is very much a community of like-minded nations committed to democratic principles, and when we enlarge NATO we want to take new members who share these values. So this will certainly be among our considerations as we proceed in this process.

But I take your point, sir, and I take the point of Congressman Hamilton that he was making earlier that I did not have a chance to comment on. This is a very important and serious commitment. We are dealing with a very important issue here, and it deserves to be discussed, and it deserves to be debated in the Congress and with the American public, and that is why we also welcome this hearing and we welcome this discussion and we think that it is a debate which should take place.

Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Johnston.

Mr. Leach.

Mr. LEACH. Well, I certainly appreciate the sober-minded approach that you have taken, and, having said that, I am not impressed with the speed with which the termination has taken place.

One has the sense that we have been awfully sensitive to the Russians at every stage of this, and that is always appropriate, to be sensitive, but there is never a good time with the Russians, and it strikes me that, given that circumstance, this is as good a time as we are likely to have at any time in the next half-century.

If we move in this direction, I would certainly hope that we not take a one- or two-state approach. It may well be that there are process aspects of this—obviously, all 15 states may not be ready for one reason or another, but I would certainly, from personal perspective, urge very rapid movement of a multistate dimension.

With regard to some of the sensitivities, they are very real about commitments to the rule of law, et cetera. I would not rule out, as many have, over a short period of time, Romania. Romania's case is not trivial. I would hope as you move in your stages that Romania not be considered a later-stage country.

Beyond that, I would also say that I believe there is bipartisan consensus in Congress to move in this direction, basic expansion of NATO. If one just simply does the mathematics, it strikes me, in terms of cost, if we have more allies and a potential adversary has fewer, the need for American troops lessens, not increases, and that doesn't imply we ought to be reducing further in Europe, but it does imply to me that if the other side has more allies, Europe needs more allies from outside its shore. If Western Europe has more allies, the need diminishes.

Granted, the obligations of defense of the country are very significant, but I think if you look at the geography of the region, it is pretty self-evident that there are a number of countries that we ought to be embracing on a rather ready basis. I would hope it would be clear that the United States is a leader in pushing this, not a retardant. Obviously, alliances take the support of everybody.

Finally, I would say that even though this is exclusively a security arrangement, it is self-evident that everything becomes reinforced. As countries enter NATO, it takes on a different economic dimension in the country and takes on a different political direction within the countries, and NATO enlargement in and of itself can bolster democratic institutions and certainly free market prospects of development. I would hope that we would be much more leading than we have been in the last few years on this issue.

In any regard, I appreciate the fact that you have come here to suggest your plays that Congress is following the Administration's direction. I don't know who is following whose direction, but I think it is a direction that this country ought to be very proud of moving toward and that everybody in America knows that there is a disadvantage to certain alliance structures.

On the other hand, this is the greatest alliance in the history of this century, if not the world. Not to take advantage of a circumstance brought to us by history, and partly the alliance structure, and partly the courage of the people of the region, would be folly.

So I hope that there is a lot of hesitancy on the Administration's part and a recognition that Congress would be in a position to support prudential movement, and it should not be a one- or two-state dimension.

Let me ask you where your thoughts are with regard to Romania.

Mr. PERINA. With regard to Romania, Romania is certainly a very important country in the region, large country, 23 million people, I believe—24 million. It is certainly an important country in

maintaining security and stability, particularly in the volatile Balkan region. But, again—

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Perina, could you move the mike closer. It is difficult to hear.

Mr. PERINA. Again, Congressman, I would not be in a position at this time to comment on the likelihood of when and whether it would be invited to join NATO.

Mr. LEACH. I appreciate the demographic observations. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Leach.

Mr. Smith.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much.

Mr. PERINA. I would like to begin by following up with some of the questions that were raised by the chairman from New York, Mr. Gilman, particularly regarding the Administration's position on the timing of a decision on enlarging NATO. You said and it is my understanding that the Administration has not made a decision on which countries should be named; is that correct?

Mr. PERINA. That is correct.

Mr. SMITH. If that is so, I think that is going to be very discouraging to some extent to the ambassadors from the three countries involved. While it is still not December, I hope that decision will be made soon, because they fully expect, as do many of us—indeed, that which is part of the impetus for this bill—that those three countries at least will be singled out sooner rather than later, and December seems like an appropriate time to our own ambassadors.

We recently had a staff trip to several countries, including the three in question, and our ambassadors are not advising the foreign ministries otherwise, and I think the impression is the other way around. They, in a sense, are giving the impression at least that there will be names. So I would certainly hope the Administration would take advantage of this opportunity.

Let me just ask you a question. Over the years we have been intimately involved in the Helsinki process and, I know, witnessed firsthand the impact the OSCE, particularly in the human dimension. Could you describe the relative importance the Administration places on human rights in this process as we move ahead, and do you agree that human rights records of a specific country ought to be scrutinized more rather than less prior to admission into NATO?

Mr. PERINA. Absolutely. I could not agree with that more strongly, Congressman. This is a key consideration for us. As I say, NATO is not just a military alliance, it is very much a political alliance as well and has traditionally been a political organization for advancing common interests of NATO countries, and we think it very important to preserve this aspect of NATO.

The common commitment to common values, democratic values, and human rights, rule of law, civilian control of the military, all of these, I think, will be very important factors in the decisionmaking process.

Mr. SMITH. What is the Department's recent assessment of the situation in Slovakia as it relates to human rights?

Mr. PERINA. We are concerned about aspects of policies in Slovakia. I tell you very honestly, I am not prepared fully to comment

on the specific human rights citation there, but we are concerned about aspects of policies in Slovakia.

Mr. SMITH. Could you, for the record perhaps, elaborate on that? That would be very helpful if you would.

With regard to the Czech Republic, there were ongoing concerns about its citizenship law. If you could perhaps respond to us about how that factors into the thinking at the Department on NATO expansion.

Mr. PERINA. I was not fully prepared to come here to discuss the human rights aspects of this. But in the case of Slovakia, for example, we are looking closely at the issue of the treatment of the large Hungarian minority and other minorities within Slovakia, and we think this is an important thing to look at.

In the case of the Czech Republic, I am sorry, what did you—

Mr. SMITH. The citizenship law.

Mr. PERINA. The citizenship law. This is something we have taken up with Czech authorities and discussed with them also.

Mr. SMITH. Could you provide some additional detail for the record? That would be most helpful.

Mr. PERINA. OK.

[The information referred to had not been received at time of printing.]

Mr. SMITH. Finally, what about the Baltic states and Ukraine? What is the current thinking in the Department about where they fit ultimately? You said that we don't want to move too fast or too slow, which was a very diplomatic answer and brought a smile to everyone's face. But where do those nations fit into this process?

Mr. PERINA. In the case of Ukraine, NATO has a close cooperative relationship with Ukraine. Ukraine is a member of PFP and the NACC, but you know that Ukraine has not at this point expressed interest in NATO membership, although I believe it is engaged in the intensified discussions we have, but purely for informational purposes at this point. But that has no impact on the fact that we recognize the crucial importance of the Ukraine in maintaining stability in this part of the world.

As for the Baltic states, they are among the partners who are engaged in the intensified discussions we are having at NATO now, and we likewise recognize that they need to be looked at closely as to all of the other partners with whom we are having these discussions.

If I may say, one of the aspects that I think should not be overlooked is that one of the reasons for the pace of this process is that we are also trying to develop other institutions. The process of NATO enlargement cannot be seen out of context. We are also trying at the same time to develop the other European institutions such as OSCE which you mentioned earlier in your comment. OSCE, the EU, we are encouraging development and the development of the EU, and the EU is engaged in making partnership agreements and so on, even if not fully enlarging.

We also see, in fact, the NACC and the PFP as really steps in the enlargement process. I mean, we should not define enlargement as simply restricted to membership itself. There can be gradations of cooperation with NATO, and we see also PFP as something that could be expanded.

So my point is, I think there are also other security channels which countries can address outside of NATO. But we know the great interest in NATO membership, and we are—that is, of course, what we are discussing here, but it should be seen in context.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Smith.

Mr. Moran.

Mr. MORAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I don't want to get into too many new issues here because I just arrived and they may have been covered, but basically my concern is what we gain other than political benefit by extending NATO's cover to countries that don't possibly have the financial capacity to reimburse us for the military commitment that it would entail.

I would like to know if we were to not just strengthen NATO but to extend NATO to include Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, for example, how much would it cost us over the next 5- to 10-year period and how many troops would have to be stationed there. And of course I am sure you addressed in your statement the implications for our relationship with Russia and the erosion of our Partnership for Peace plan.

Do you want to just synopsise some of that?

Mr. PERINA. Yes, sir. We did discuss costs here, and I made the point that it is very difficult for us to make that estimate without knowing who the new members will be and what the security environment will be when they become members.

Mr. MORAN. We are assuming we are talking about Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic at this point, not Slovakia or anyone else. If we were to expand, those would be the first three countries, would they not?

Mr. PERINA. We are not in a position to make that decision at this time, no, sir. We are still in a process of evaluating the applications of all of the 15 partners who are interested in NATO membership and with whom we are having discussions, and we are not prepared at this time to mention any front runners.

Mr. MORAN. There is a problem in picking and choosing vis-a-vis the other 12 countries that would not be chosen, I am sure. The European allies, it would seem, ought to play a role here.

Are there any European allies who are prepared to make a financial commitment that would be proportionate to their role in NATO if we were to expand to, let's just say theoretically, those three countries?

Mr. PERINA. Are there any allies who are prepared to make a—

Mr. MORAN. Who have voiced any willingness to make a proportionate military commitment?

Mr. PERINA. I think there was recognition in the NATO enlargement study, which was agreed within the Alliance, that there would be a cost to enlargement. But also I think it was pointed out that we would expect the new member countries who come in to bear a large amount of that cost in terms of adjusting their forces to interoperability and so on. So it would not fall exclusively on existing members by any means.

It is possible that the costs would not be as high as some of the high-estimate costs we have been hearing in certain studies. For

example, you mentioned stationing of troops. The NATO study did conclude that. At this time, under present circumstances there is no a priori requirement for stationing either troops or nuclear forces on the territory of new members. This is not something which would be foreseen at this time.

Mr. MORAN. Has CSCE taken a position on this, on expanding NATO?

Mr. PERINA. OSCE.

Mr. MORAN. The Conference on Security Cooperation in Europe.

Mr. PERINA. Has it taken a position on this? Not that I am aware.

Mr. MORAN. I don't think they have either. You might think that would be a good place to solicit an opinion. Well, I don't know. I know what your position is, and all I am doing is giving you an opportunity to reiterate it.

I personally think that it is far too premature to station troops, but, even more so, to expand NATO's umbrella, when we have so many emerging democracies that would have a legitimate claim for that type of Western allied protection, and I think it severely undermines our relationship with Russia and previous members of the Soviet Union because it gives a clear implication that there is a dividing line, a fault line, between the West and East and between democracies and former Communists, traditional democracies and those that are not, and I am afraid that much of our foreign policy would be determined by domestic, ethnic, and political considerations, which are not necessarily the best way to make such determinations.

So I would strongly oppose expanding NATO, although I think a lot can be done to strengthen NATO, particularly on the part of our European allies.

I appreciate you coming to testify. I know your good work in our foreign policy, and it is nice to see you here, Mr. Perina.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. Hamilton.

Mr. HAMILTON. I want to get in my mind a little better the attitude of the Russians. Is Russian policy clearly today opposed to enlargement of NATO?

Mr. PERINA. Is it clearly today opposed to the enlargement of NATO?

Mr. HAMILTON. Have they just said flatly, "We are against it"?

Mr. PERINA. They have expressed very serious concern about it in the past. As to today, I have not had indication. I think there has been an evolution in Russian thinking on this point.

Mr. HAMILTON. A softening on it.

Mr. PERINA. A softening, I do believe that.

Mr. HAMILTON. Do you think after the election that the Russian opposition to NATO enlargement may diminish?

Mr. PERINA. I would hope so. I hope there would be, regardless of the election—that there would be a gradual recognition of what we have consistently tried to convince the Russians of.

Mr. HAMILTON. It is reported that General Lebed—I think that is what I saw—has no objection to the enlargement of NATO.

Mr. PERINA. Yes.

Mr. HAMILTON. Do we think in terms of Russia coming into NATO?

Mr. PERINA. I think there has been no decision on where the process of enlargement may end.

Mr. HAMILTON. We don't exclude the possibility of Russia coming into NATO?

Mr. PERINA. Since we don't know where in the process we will end, I would not exclude that, but I think it would be down the road and we would have to see a greatly reformed Russia.

Mr. HAMILTON. OK.

Now, I have heard reports that Foreign Minister Primakov has been very strong in some of the meetings with the Secretary about the enlargement of NATO; is that accurate?

Mr. PERINA. There have been exchanges on this subject.

Mr. HAMILTON. Has he said at some point it is unacceptable?

Mr. PERINA. I honestly cannot tell you at this point, Congressman, if those words were used.

Mr. HAMILTON. OK.

Mr. Chairman, I have taken too much time.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Perina, one last question by Mr. Leach.

Mr. LEACH. I just wanted to make one observation. I think it is very important that the Congress and the Administration make it very clear that whatever decisions are made in NATO are unrelated to the outcome of the election in Russia; it is neither a sign of strength nor weakness of whoever is elected nor a point of retaliation or reward, whoever is elected; that NATO is a long-term alliance; and that that has to be expressed so that it doesn't either advantage or disadvantage, in a reaction sense, the circumstance in Moscow.

This is my personal opinion. Is it the position of the United States Department of State?

Mr. PERINA. It is our position that the decision on NATO enlargement will be made solely by the members of NATO and that the Russians do not have a veto on this question.

Mr. LEACH. I asked a strategic question earlier, and you told me how many people lived in Romania. I ask you a strategic question now, and you tell me NATO will make a decision on its enlargement. Those are self-evident facts. I would like you to respond in a way that reflects a vision of thought.

I am asserting to you that I believe the position of the United States of America should be that decisions on NATO are unrelated to the election of who wins or who loses coming up in Russia. Is that the position of the U.S. Department of State?

Mr. PERINA. That is the position. I thought I made that point to Congressman Smith, yes.

Mr. LEACH. Very good. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Bereuter.

Mr. BEREUTER. Before I heard a comment about the expansion of NATO being necessary for the revitalization of NATO. It was made on an exchange here, and I wanted to suggest, this member disagrees with that concept. NATO is being revitalized by now a Combined Joint Task Force concept that is workable; by France's larger involvement; and, by the unfortunate requirements that are levied upon NATO countries by the conflict in Bosnia.

We will expand membership into Central Europe and perhaps Eastern Europe because it is in our national interest to avoid conflicts, be it international or ethnic conflicts. That is what the reason for expanding NATO is all about. It has nothing to do with revitalizing NATO, in my judgment.

The CHAIRMAN. One last question. I would like to go back to the earlier exchange we had, and it is not clear yet, in my mind, what the Administration's position is going to be on naming countries in December. So let me ask once again, does the Administration advocate naming names in December or not naming names?

Mr. PERINA. We have not reached a position on this question, Mr. Chairman. We believe that important decisions will be made in December, but whether the actual naming of names will occur there at that meeting—at the NATO ministerial meeting, I presume you are referring to—that decision has not been made by the Administration.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, again, I guess that underscores the need for legislation to try to move this forward.

Mr. Perina, I want to thank you for testifying before us today.

The CHAIRMAN. Our second panel consists of three acknowledged experts on national security matters. The first is Mr. Peter Rodman. Mr. Rodman is currently director, National Security Programs, for the Nixon Center for Peace and Freedom. He served previously as deputy assistant to the President for National Security Affairs during the Reagan administration, director of the State Department Policy Planning Staff under Secretary of State George Shultz, and was a member of the National Security Council staff during the Nixon, Reagan, and Bush administrations. He is someone we, along with other Members of the Congress, often turn to when we need some sound advice on difficult policy questions. We are pleased to have Mr. Rodman with us today.

We also have Lieutenant General William Odom, who has been director of National Security Studies at the Hudson Institute since his retirement from active duty. He is a graduate of the U.S. Military Academy—one of my constituents earlier—and was director of the National Security Agency from 1981 to 1985. He also served 4 years as military assistant to President Carter's National Security Adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski.

Finally, we have Ambassador Jack Matlock, Jr., who currently is professor in the practice of international diplomacy at Colombia. He is a retired career foreign service officer who last served as ambassador to the Soviet Union from 1987 to 1991 and hosted a number of our congressional delegations in that capacity. Before then, he served as our ambassador to Czechoslovakia and served on the National Security Council staff.

Gentlemen, we welcome all of you, and we will turn to Mr. Rodman first, and you may put your full statement in the record, summarize, or whatever you see fit.

#### **STATEMENT OF PETER W. RODMAN, DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL SECURITY PROGRAMS, NIXON CENTER FOR PEACE AND FREEDOM**

Mr. RODMAN. Thank you very much, and thank you for the leadership your committee has shown on this issue in recent years.

I have a longer statement I would be happy to submit for the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection.

Mr. RODMAN. I would like to make two points very briefly based on this longer statement. The first has to do with why time may be running out on this issue, and the second is some ideas I have about how to deal with the Russians on this question.

As to the first point, I think there is a great nervousness in Central Europe. It is particularly evident in statements by Czech President Havel. I think the status quo is not going to hold. It may unravel if by the end of the year there are not some definite decisions by the Alliance.

The Central Europeans feel that 7 years after 1989, if the West is not ready to bite the bullet, they have to draw their own conclusions from that. They will conclude that the West simply does not have the courage or the inclination to protect them. They will drift back into some kind of neutrality or into the Russian orbit and make the best accommodation they can with the Russians. This, to me, will be the Finlandization of Central Europe and the partial reversal of what was achieved in 1989.

We have to bite the bullet, and if the West doesn't decide soon, the Central Europeans will drift away. That is my first point.

The second point is about dealing with the Russians. The Russians seem to want a number of things from us. It is true, they are talking about compromise, as Mr. Perina did indicate, but they seem to want a number of things. They want some reassurances about nuclear weapons, about NATO infrastructure not moving eastward; they want to be part of the G-7. I think they are going to continue to want economic aid from the West, particularly after how President Yeltsin has been inflating the economy recently.

My view is, all of these things can be considered or discussed but *all* of these things ought to be linked to how they behave on NATO enlargement. There are reassurances we can give them, but they should be conditioned on their calling off the campaign against NATO enlargement.

In the long run, relations between the West and Russia can be benign. If they accept the independence of these states, then there is no objective basis for conflict between Russia and NATO. But the Russians have to call off the dogs on NATO enlargement. I don't see how we can subsidize their economy if they are threatening the Balts or the Ukrainians, for example.

Among other things, I think this gives us a strategy for protecting the Balts and the Ukrainians who may not be admitted into NATO in the first wave. It is what I call the "shooting the hostages" problem. The Russians have made threatening noises to the effect that, if we bring some Central Europeans in, they may retaliate against the Baltic states or Ukraine. We need to make clear to them there would be a huge political cost to them for doing so. If they still continue to hold these countries hostage and to threaten them, then we owe them *no* reassurances about what weapons we may choose to deploy in new NATO members; they cannot expect any favorable G-7 relations or economic relations. They must understand in fact, that if they "shoot the hostages" in the interim pe-

riod, then the curtain will come down and their whole relationship with the West will go down the drain.

These are, as I said, some suggestions for a strategy for dealing with the Russians that may offer some protection for those who are not admitted in the first phase. But I have dealt with these questions fully in my statement, and I am happy to accelerate this discussion.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Rodman appears in the appendix.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Rodman.  
General Odom.

#### STATEMENT OF GENERAL WILLIAM ODOM, DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL SECURITY, HUDSON INSTITUTE

General ODOM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I, too, will submit a written statement and use the opportunity at this moment—

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection.

General ODOM [continuing]. To summarize a few points.

I am in complete agreement with the points made by Peter Rodman. I think it is terribly important legislation. Urgency is a matter of grave concern, to me, on this policy. To equivocate, as the Administration has, I think, is courting a major strategic disaster.

When one looks back, the reunification of Germany within NATO was probably the greatest diplomatic achievement of the century, and I think historians will value it very highly. Almost as important will be whether or not we complete this consolidation with the expansion of NATO into Eastern Europe, and we are slowly letting it get away from us. Mr. Rodman made this point; there are several other points I think could be made to reinforce the urgency issues.

Delay will bring about the very results that the critics of going ahead warn us that expansion will bring. Delay will bring more problems in Eastern Europe; delay will bring a more troublesome Russia; delay will eventually bring an erosion of NATO in the West. We have cause and effect reversed in the arguments that oppose early expansion.

Let me next comment on military costs. You have heard testimony about various estimates of the CBO, GAO, and others. I accept those—the Rand Corporation, et cetera—as valid, straightforward analyses. But it is all a matter of what one perceives the threat to be.

The threat is not tanks from Russia on the central front. We took Spain into NATO and asked them to spend almost nothing for a long time. I think it would be a big mistake to start a big military modernization in central European countries that join NATO. We should be very, very cautious and slow about the military transformation of these states. We can make the costs high. We would be much wiser to keep them low.

The issue of the risk that one takes with American lives here is not meeting a major adversary on the eastern Polish border. It is fiddling around and allowing things to take the course they took in Bosnia and then having to commit much larger forces and take bigger risks because we failed to get ahead of them by an early NATO expansion.

So, the whole cost issue strikes me as essentially a red herring.

Now Russia. Let me make two or three simple points to supplement Peter Rodman's remarks on this point. We have not enhanced the position of pro-liberal, pro-democratic, pro-market forces in the Russian leadership by forbearing on NATO expansion.

If one looks at the members of the Yeltsin Government and at his official policies toward the West, in 1992-1993, they were liberal and pro-Western. I think it was in 1993 that Yeltsin brought his Foreign Minister with him to Warsaw and Prague and told these countries they could enter NATO; he had no objections. He then went home and reversed himself, not only reversed himself but also moved people out of his Administration who were liberal in their policy views. He has eventually fired his Foreign Minister, Kosiev, who took a very cooperative policy toward the West.

The record of our forbearance is that we have a much-harder-line, more neo-imperialist Russian regime than we did before. Not vice-versa as it was assumed would occur.

So the arguments about forbearing and getting some sort of credit with Russia which we can eventually cash in strikes me as flying in the face of historical facts. And can I go back and cite the historical record for three or four centuries, and I think it is essentially the same.

We should take an approach on NATO expansion like we took on INF. We made the INF decision and heard all kinds of cries from Moscow, but we deployed INF and they adapted to it. Expansion of NATO to fill the strategic vacuum in Central Europe objectively is very much in the interest of a Russia that wants a market economy and democratic development. Some Russians may not understand it, but some do, and some have said so.

The climate has become so bad in Moscow as a result of this howling against the expansion of NATO that those who understand this reality can no longer speak openly as they did in 1992.

Let me say this—I agree with Deputy Assistant Secretary Perina when he said we do have to keep open the doors to Russia. We can't make Russia come in, but I think we must always present Russia with constructive opportunities.

I have made a proposal; for this purpose let me simplify here. I think the OSCE should create a security committee which has the following members: Russia, Ukraine, Britain, Germany, France, and the United States. And when this body can reach consensus on issues of security and peacekeeping in Europe, it should be able to act militarily. And it should not require consent from all the other members.

That mechanism, you know, now exists in the U.N. Security Council, and it was put there to overcome many problems of the League of Nations. The League of Nations has more in common with OSCE as it is now organized than it does with the United Nations. Adding a security committee to OSCE would create a forum for a "Europe to the Urals" security system in addition to NATO expansion. If Russia wants to act constructively in that arena, we should welcome it, and we should encourage it strongly.

I would also encourage that we go back and pick up a Soviet proposal that was made in 1990 which I think we mistakenly rejected. That was to create a four-power group in the Far East, including

Russia, Japan, China, and the United States, to oversee what is happening on the Korean peninsula and to make sure we don't let events get out of control, which they well could, with the collapse of the North Korean regime or some other unanticipated development there. Also, Peter Rodman said bring Russia into the G-7, making it a G-8. These three major forums recognize objectively Russia's presence as a great power, and they would give Russia an opportunity to contribute constructively. If it doesn't come into these fora, we can hardly be blamed.

Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Odom.

The CHAIRMAN. Ambassador Matlock.

### **STATEMENT OF JACK MATLOCK, FORMER U.S. AMBASSADOR TO THE SOVIET UNION**

Mr. MATLOCK. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and I also want to compliment you on holding these hearings. I think the issue is a very important one and there are few issues, in my opinion, more important for American foreign policy and American security than the health and future of the NATO alliance.

I was invited just in the last couple of days and have not had time to prepare a formal statement, so maybe you will bear with me if I explain orally my approach to this issue.

First of all, it does seem to me that it is very important, as we debate this issue, to think very carefully about what I consider the most basic issues. What are the most basic issues? How do we ensure the security of the United States for the future, not from past threats but from future threats? How do we ensure the security of the Alliance? How do we bring East Europe and Central Europe, those countries that share a civilization with Western Europe and with ourselves, into a European system more firmly than it had been in the past?

I think those are very fundamental issues, but I think we have to keep them in mind because if we select one method or another and say we must do it this way, and if we don't do it this way we are losing the battle, we are making a jump of logic or illogic which is not always justified.

When you think about it, none of those primary goals are going to be fully ensured unless we follow a strategy and appropriate tactics to bring Russia into the European security system as a full-fledged member.

Now I am not saying we have to bring Russia into NATO, but it must participate in securing security in Europe. Russia is a country with still more than 20,000 nuclear warheads, with the largest chemical weapon stocks, with bacteriological weapons which we can not be sure have been destroyed. We must also recognize that it is a country which is going through a very traumatic redefinition of what its national purpose is, what it means to be a Russian, what Russia means. And, of course, Russia is going through a Presidential election right now.

By the way, I am very encouraged by that election. As a student of Russian history, it seems to me that the turnout is remarkable, as is the fact that the great majority voted against returning to the past despite all their present difficulties.

Now, if we look at what the threats really are likely to be in the future, it does seem to me that objectively we would have to conclude that NATO, as an organization, is probably not going to be the principal method of ensuring the security of the United States or of the Alliance. That doesn't mean it won't be important. It is going to be important for different reasons.

The reason I talk about future threats, I think it important not to get too bound up in what past threats have been. In my view, that is exactly the mistake the French made after World War I. They decided that any future war won't be a replay of the First World War. They built Maginot Line, and they did their best to keep Germany down so it wouldn't be a threat. Neither policy worked.

We were much wiser after World War II when we saw we weren't going to have peace in Western Europe if we didn't include those who had been defeated in the security system. Whether Russia ultimately is part of the European security system is a decision the Russians will make, but we should keep the door open and do what we can to encourage it.

Therefore, I am disturbed by the debate based on the slogan, "We can't give Russia a veto." It seems to me that is a true red herring. Of course you don't give Russia or any other country a veto on what you do.

But if we take that further and say we are going to ignore the effects on Russia and go ahead on the assumption that we still have to protect against the dangers of the past, we tie ourselves up in a policy that could turn out to be counterproductive. It seems to me we should be asking the question: "Are there ways to achieve several ends that we need to achieve without impairing our future security?" We have to be very careful about what our aims are and how we go about carrying them out.

It is very clear that it is extremely important to the security of Europe and the United States that the movement toward democracy in Russia continues. We can't ensure that, but actually the movement has not been, in my opinion, negative. Russia has made remarkable progress in very few years.

It is true that NATO is not a threat to Russia and most Russians understand this, although the Russian chauvinists who feel they need an enemy to justify more aggressive policies, will try to make that case. Given the stereotypes of the past that exist there, that argument will not be negligible.

But the more important impact that this can have on the Russian and body politic is the implication that Russia is not part of the system to which the other European powers belong and that they are ignoring Russia's interests. Russia has legitimate interests, and if we take the position that we don't have to take Russia's interests into account, that Russia has already shown that it is hostile—and I don't believe that is the case—then we not only encourage a movement toward more exclusiveness and pulling out of Europe, which would have a negative effect on democracy in Russia, it also would remove a very important lever we have to influence Russian policy.

Yes, our dealings with Russia should be conditional. Yes, we should find ways to curb imperialist tendencies and talk and poli-

cies. I think we have better means of doing so if we move in a negotiating mode and try to find some solution which convinces the Russian political leadership that we are being made part of the European security structure.

General Odom's idea for a political directorate at the OSCE is something that needs the most serious consideration. I think it makes a lot of sense. But you know, if we look at our basic and most important national security needs, we need to bear in mind the most likely future threat from those nuclear weapons in Russia. And that is the possibility that they may get out to irresponsible hands, not that they are going to be fired at us.

That is something we should worry about. That is something we should continue to work with the Russian Government, using Nunn-Lugar funds, using other instruments, which I think we very wisely have done. But I have to tell you that if we move willy-nilly without making some reasonable arrangement with the Russians and simply expand NATO no matter what, then it is going to make further arms reductions infinitely more difficult. If you talk to any of your colleagues in the Russian State Duma, they will probably tell you that the ratification of START II is very much in question unless NATO is able to expand in a way which Russia sees as consistent with its own security interests.

There are also dangers inherent in a partial NATO expansion, dangers which have not been completely explored and thought through. Suppose NATO brings in the countries that the legislation mentions. This leaves a lot out. Does NATO then bring them in also? Where does it stop? This is simply going to lead to more arguments, and the closer NATO gets to the current Russian borders, the more the expansion is going to seem provocative to the Russian Government.

It seems to me there is no other way the Russians can read this. I don't necessarily excuse them for reading it that way, but think if the shoe were on the other foot and Russia were extending an alliance it dominated close to our borders, we would probably see it as a potential threat ourselves.

We need to ask ourselves, what position does NATO membership for the Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary put the Baltic countries in? Or Ukraine, which is probably not going to apply for membership in the future. I have not heard convincing answers to that question. I also do not agree with the other speakers about the urgency. I really read the situation quite differently.

I have lived in the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary and have great respect for them. I am a great backer of their being brought into the European community structure. Psychologically, they are already there.

There is no reason in the world for them to make a deal with the Russians. Why? Because the conventional forces in Russia have probably never been weaker, though they have a lot of destructive arms.

I agree with General Odom that the task in the future is not to keep tanks from moving into these countries. What these countries need is an economic tie and political ties with Europe, and in some cases moving too rapidly on NATO expansion will give our Euro-

pean allies excuses not to bring them into the European Community as rapidly as they should, and they must, in my view.

In sum, I simply don't see any convincing evidence that there is any urgency in the decision on NATO expansion..

Now, having said that, what should we negotiate? There have been several questions this morning about the Russian position, and I think that the Russians themselves have been floundering around for a position. They have reversed themselves at times. But I haven't found any Russian yet who feels that it would be beneficial to Russian democratization and the development of better cooperation with the West if NATO acts without regard to what Russians consider their real concerns. And I think we should listen to what they are saying. If we want to make partners of them, and I think that is an objective that we should pursue, then we have to be willing to talk to them.

What am I hearing now? I am hearing that there is no Russian objection to Article V guarantees; there is no objection to additional countries coming into NATO's political structure. As most Russians will tell you, of course they are not thinking of attacking these countries. However, they say, if you bring new members into the military structures, if you reserve the right to station nuclear weapons in them, there is no way we are going to be able to ignore this.

Now, I agree with General Odom that negotiation of the unification of Germany was a brilliant stroke of diplomacy. I witnessed that, and I hold it in the highest regard. But you know, as a diplomat, I would say one of the reasons we were able to reach the agreements on Germany was that we did not take an absolute position that nothing was negotiable. The Russians wanted limitations on the Bundeswehr, and we said we can't give you that, but talk to the Germans, and they got it. They wanted help in building housing for the troops that would leave East Germany. They negotiated with the Germans.

We began to talk to them about ways we could change NATO's strategy to make it more acceptable, and finally, Gorbachev did get an informal, but clear, commitment that if Germany united and stayed in NATO, the borders of NATO would not move eastward. All right, that wasn't a legal commitment, but it was made. And to ignore it now and to say, we must rush on, the only reason for which is an assumption that Russia is inevitably a military threat, always will be, and must be cut off. Conceivably, things could evolve in that direction, but it would take a long time, and I think that if we refuse to go into a negotiating mode, if we use slogans such as "no veto" as an excuse not to try to bring the Russians in, we are going to end up with a greater security problem than we have now.

General Lebed, who has just been named to a very senior position, has been quoted several times as saying he is not against NATO expansion, because it will weaken NATO, and I think he may be right. I think we have to think very carefully of the impact on NATO.

Finally, let me say, and Mr. Chairman, I say with some reluctance because we have worked together for many, many years, and I can't think of another occasion when our opinions differed on one

of these matters, but I must say perhaps as a diplomat, perhaps because of my analysis, that I don't find the current legislation particularly helpful. There are a number of reasons for this, which maybe I have already implied, but there is one in particular that I would hope you would bear in mind, and that is this does have to be a collective decision. And yes, the allies basically do want American leadership, but they don't want American arm-twisting, and if they get the impression that our motivation is primarily domestic political, then this is really going to make it harder for our diplomats to get a wholehearted backing of our NATO allies. If we are seen as pushing this through in the eyes of some Europeans too rapidly, and largely because this is an election year and some people are up for election and need certain groups of votes, that is really not going to help us strengthen NATO as it occurs.

I am one who believes that we can find ways, but I do think that we have to take it with due consideration for all the complexities and keep the door open for building a larger security structure which will bring Russia in, which will provide some leverage over Russian misbehavior, rather than in a way which Russia inevitably will interpret as cutting them off and ignoring their true security interests.

Thank you very much.

Chairman GILMAN. Thank you very much, Ambassador Matlock.

Chairman GILMAN. Gentlemen, we do have some questions. We may have a vote very shortly, so we will try to be brief.

Mr. Rodman, one concern that we sometimes hear about enlarging NATO into Central and Eastern Europe is that the future course of many of the governments there is unclear, and the fact that former Communists recently won a number of elections in that region is cited as evidence that some of those countries, if admitted to NATO, may ultimately become Trojan horses.

Would you agree with that view, or do you agree with those who say that the former Communists probably would never have been elected if the West had moved faster to bring those nations into NATO and other Western institutions?

Mr. RODMAN. I agree more with the latter. I do believe that the failure of both the EU and NATO to embrace these countries over 7 years now has contributed enormously to the demoralization of the pro-Western forces in these countries.

On the other hand, there is an objective problem, given that there are now neo-Communists in political leadership positions, and the security organs may never have been cleansed very effectively. There are ways of dealing with that problem, but I recognize that it is a problem that we are going to have to deal with. I would suggest two things. One of the conditions of membership ought to be they will have to clean house. The prospect of membership has to be used as leverage to get them to do the maximum to clean house, particularly in the security services.

Second, the Alliance reserves the right to withhold sensitive information. If we worry about certain channels, we can withhold the most sensitive secrets, as we did with NATO allies on various occasions in the past—Portugal, for example. So we have ways of protecting ourselves against this as a practical matter.

Chairman GILMAN. Thank you.

General Odom, there have been recent suggestions from Moscow that Russia could accept the admission to NATO of Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and perhaps other nations if NATO were to commit not to extend NATO military structures into those countries.

Do you think we should explore such an arrangement with the Russians, or do you think making such a commitment would set a dangerous precedent?

General ODOM. I don't object to having talks with the Russians about it. I would object to formalizing it in any kind of an open agreement.

That said, let me say from a technical military operational viewpoint, there isn't much reason to station nuclear forces or even any Western NATO forces in three new member countries. The present mobility of our ground forces and air forces is such that we can move them very, very quickly, and we would have strategic warning if it required the moving of the kind of forces we have in Germany.

So those are issues which, when the Russians raise them, you know, I don't take them very seriously as substantive problems. I do think that we could make a mistake if we allowed the Russians to tie us up in some kind of formal language which we would later regret if circumstances changed rather dramatically. But I don't see why informally we couldn't tell the Russians, look, objectively we are not going to put any troops there, or we are not going to put nuclear weapons there, but we are not going to give you a formal commitment that we won't do it forever.

Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, General.

Ambassador Matlock, should we infer from your testimony that you think that President Clinton has mishandled the issue of NATO enlargement because he has moved too quickly? If so, what would you recommend? What should he be doing now?

Mr. MATLOCK. I don't think the question is a question of speed. You know, I think we have the luxury of time to work these things out. We are now so dominant militarily, this gives us a lot of leeway, and I am not one who feels that there are great urgencies involved here.

The two aspects that I do disagree with is the idea that it should be automatic regardless of Russia's reaction, though I agree that Russia shouldn't have a veto. I do think that you make it very, very difficult psychologically to negotiate something if that is the position you take. I mean after all, if you want to work out a budget agreement or anything else, you have much less chance if you are saying these things are nonnegotiable, we are going to do it anyway. You have to sit down, talk to the other side and see if you can't work something out. And I think that should take precedence so long as Russia is not a clear threat to these countries, and the fact is, it isn't. I mean I don't see how anybody can say that it is now.

So I think we have time. I think that I can understand the political reasons for the Administration's position, and I certainly would agree with that. We don't need a partisan debate over this. I don't think this is a partisan issue.

But I do think that I would have preferred to see the decision cast more in terms of our fundamental national interests and NATO's interests, and those of the Central Europeans' countries as well. The fact that many of the Central and East European leaders want to come into NATO immediately certainly should be taken into consideration, but national leaders are not always totally right about the precise timing or what their national interests are. Therefore, I would like to see the debate cast in a different context, a more fundamental one.

Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.

Mr. Leach.

Mr. LEACH. Let me just say, Ambassador Matlock, I have a great respect for your career, but I am really stumped by some of the logic that you have presented to the committee today.

You have suggested that by bringing certain states into NATO, we will be weakening NATO. That is a very profound observation for which—

Mr. MATLOCK. I said it was possible that we could.

Mr. LEACH. Well, you lay that on the table, Ambassador, and that is facile to the point of stretching credulity.

Now, you tell me how an alliance of Western Europe is weakened by the entrance of the Polish Army, the Czech Army, the Hungarian Army, and I will tell you, the United States of America is in a lot more secure position with soldiers of that tradition and that capacity. Now, maybe you would rather have them neutral in a conflict, or worse yet, members of the former Warsaw Pact. You say you have to deal with the future instead of the past. The future is very, very hard to perceive, but if Russia is in a position to pick off one by one, it is in a much stronger position today.

Now, I personally think if you take a country that doesn't currently seek NATO entrance, Ukraine, is Ukraine in a strengthened position having Romania on its flank as a member, having Poland as a member, conceivably the Slovakian Republic at some point in time as a member, or is it in a better position with these countries as neutral?

I am hard-pressed as we look to the future not to think that Ukraine is more secure with others coming into NATO at this time. And what we are looking at here is the precept of self-determination and how best to embolden it. There will always be the threat that Russia has against individual nation States. But the question is, is it weakened or strengthened by given acts at given periods of time? Not to take advantage of this time in this setting to me would be just extraordinary.

Second statement you made: If these countries come into NATO, this is a statement of Ambassador Jack Matlock, that will mean it is less likely they will come into economic integration in the European Community.

That defies logic as well, Ambassador. When you strengthen your strategic integration, the logical likelihood is you strengthen your economic integration, not that you become more, you know, more unlikely. You become more likely.

You made a third statement that you hate to have this involved in the politics of the moment. Well, government is about politics. One of the statements of Secretary Perina, I think, is very impres-

sive. He says—this is his opening statement—“The Administration welcomes the efforts that you,” that means our distinguished Chairman, “have lead the bill with bipartisan support for the President’s policy of enlargement.”

Now, General Odom thinks that the Administration has equivocated a bit. I happen to agree with General Odom. But the point here is the Administration is saying they support a policy of enlargement. They are appreciative of Congress moving in that direction as well. And so, what the chairman of this committee is trying to do is build congressional consensus. What this committee is trying to do, at least some on the committee, trying to tell the Administration there is some support in this direction and to feel unconstrained by American politics.

In any regard, I know of very few issues where it is easier to pick on the other side, but I have never heard observations from a professional in the area that are as lacking in compellingness as the several you have made today.

Mr. MATLOCK. Well, thank you for your comments. May I simply respond?

Mr. LEACH. Yes.

Mr. MATLOCK. First of all, I didn’t say that bringing them in would weaken NATO; I said that it could. And I say that because I do not think that there is any—at this moment—any reasonable threat of a land war in Europe using conventional forces. Therefore, it is sort of irrelevant.

Mr. LEACH. But isn’t the reason for—

Mr. MATLOCK. Now, I would ask you, do you think that the security of these countries and NATO would be improved if an expansion, which occurs in a way which induces the Russian leaders to put greater emphasis upon nuclear weapons, to perhaps station them closer to NATO borders, and to refuse future arms reduction negotiations, do you think that is going to increase the security of the Alliance or the cohesion of the Alliance?

Well, one can make an argument each way. All I said was that General Lebed said that the expansion could well weaken NATO, and he might be right under certain circumstances. This was not a prediction.

On the next point, here again, it does seem to me that we have time to think through these issues. I think as a Nation we are still trying to decide what our role should be in the post-cold war world. I don’t think we have the clear guideposts of the past. But I do think that some of the thinking and some sort of the automatic assumptions that I see behind the resolution we are discussing rely much too much on the threats of the past and haven’t given sufficient thought to the threats of the future. And I will stand by that.

I am not accusing this committee of playing politics, I didn’t mean that. I just said in general, I think this is an issue which should be discussed calmly and without partisanship. So far as I know, up to now it has been, and I think that is important.

Mr. LEACH. Excuse me. Isn’t that the reason we are holding this hearing?

Mr. MATLOCK. Absolutely. And I started by complimenting you for doing so. Not all of the writings on this question have been entirely free of partisanship, but what I am saying is that these are

difficult issues, and a number of assertions made are not necessarily as self-evident as they seem to the people who make them. I think we do have the luxury of time, and I am not one of those who sees evidence that somehow there is a great urgency, that possibilities or windows are going to close if we don't act this year or early next year. I think we have more time than that.

Mr. LEACH. I want to honor the Chairman's concern for our time limits. If that is an imperfect time, what is a better time?

Mr. MATLOCK. A better time would be when we have fully explored the possibility of doing this in a way which will make the Russian Government comfortable that we are taking their interests into account, and to the degree that they will be reasonable, that we will work cooperatively with them. That is the time to do it. Until it becomes clear that we can not get Russian cooperation on important security issues, I don't think the time has come.

Chairman GILMAN. The gentleman's time has expired.

Mr. Bereuter.

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I apologize for having to leave to visit with the Rules Committee Chairman about a legislative matter, but apparently you were provocative, Ambassador Matlock, and at least I am catching up on some of the discussion here, your comments, via the dialog between you and Mr. Leach.

I think it might be instructive to me if I could ask General Odom if you would comment, and, Mr. Rodman, if you would comment, on the things about Ambassador Matlock's testimony with which you most disagree or give you greatest concerns.

We gather a panel supposedly of disparate views to some extent so that the dialog among you should be just as valuable as anything else. I would invite the comments of you two gentlemen and any kind of response that Ambassador Matlock would like in turn to make, and that will complete my questioning.

Mr. ODOM. Shall I begin, Mr. Chairman?

Chairman GILMAN. If I might interrupt just a moment, I regret I have to go on to another meeting. Mr. Leach will conduct the hearing, but I do want to thank the panelists for giving us the benefit of your expert views. Thank you.

Mr. ODOM. Three things bother me about Ambassador Matlock's testimony. I accept his challenge to go back and look at the fundamentals for U.S. security. Fundamental for U.S. security is our relations with Germany in Europe. That is primary. Everything else is secondary. The Germans want NATO expansion in the worst way. The Germans do not want to be the eastmost liberal democracy in Europe facing a group of countries where they range from dictatorships to old—renewed semi-democratic Communist regimes, or whatever, facing a troublemaking competitive diplomacy with Moscow encouraging them to cut deals over the heads of these East European States, in an environment where the British and the French Governments are cultivating alliances in that vacuum against Germany and against Russia, or some other combination of this.

So if we go back and answer his question, I get an answer quite different from the one he does. At least I reason that way.

Now, the next of his points has to do with the purpose of NATO. He says NATO was designed to keep a military threat out of Europe. I think it really is important to go back and look at why NATO was created. We were pulling our troops out of Europe vigorously, rapidly, when it was created, even though there was a Berlin blockade. There was no mention of a Soviet military threat in debate over NATO in France. There wasn't even a mention of a Soviet political and ideological threat in France of the Soviet Union or in the Benelux. There was a little mention in Britain. In the United States we saw no Soviet military threat; we saw mainly an ideological political threat. President Truman promised Senator Vandenburg he wouldn't put U.S. troops in Europe to get him to help ratify NATO and he blocked it in the Senate.

The real arguments about the military threat came when the Korean War broke out. We set up NATO for a set of rationales best articulated by Robert Schuman and Jean Monnet, the conceivers, the architects of European economic integration. They realized that Germany was the problem and that quarrels among the Germans, the British and the French would prevent cooperation and rapid reconstruction after the war. They knew they needed a substitute for a supra-national authority there, and they asked the United States to provide it in the form of our military-political presence in NATO, and we did. The result has been a dramatic reduction of those old quarrels and unprecedented economic growth.

Now, those very same reasons exist in East Europe. If it offends Russia for us to head off problems there, I am sorry. Our interest in expanding in that area and in solidifying Central Europe and the enormous economic potential there vastly outweighs anything we can gain from our relationship with Russia. So when you get into Ambassador Matlock's priorities, I am absolutely confused by them.

Finally, there is never going to be any time, if we are negotiating the issue of whether the Russians are happy about NATO expansion, that you won't find some Russians who will be against it. In fact, Ambassador Matlock's encouragement that we delay and make that a major negotiating effort is to invite all of the hardliners in Russia to say, "Look, we are keeping NATO from expanding, we are having an effect!" Until we act with our allies to expand NATO, we are going to continue to enhance the credibility of the very people we don't want to see seize the political reins in Moscow. So on all three of those accounts, I am totally confused. If I start with his logic, I don't get to the same policy recommendations or implications.

Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Rodman.

Mr. RODMAN. I would like to focus on just one point, which is that there is some urgency about this. The Central Europeans see two things happening simultaneously. They see a very disturbing nationalistic turn in Russian foreign policy which has been going on for the last year or more, and it will continue even under Yeltsin. They see a Russia getting back on its feet geopolitically even before it gets back on its feet economically, and they are worried about this.

Second, they see the West not yet ready to make a decision about giving them a security guarantee. And as 7 years have gone by, at

some point they are going to put these two things together and come to a conclusion, which is that the West is not going to guarantee their independence. And the policy conclusion they will draw, is to drift back into what they will see as being in the shadow of Russian power, make some accommodation with the Russians, call themselves neutral, distance themselves a little bit from us. This will be what I call the Finlandization of Central Europe, which to me represents the partial reversal of everything that happened in 1989 that we were cheering about for so long. And I find that an appalling outcome.

The critics of NATO enlargement say everything is fine, why disturb it? And my worry is that the present status quo, which is fairly benign, may well unravel if we don't consolidate what has happened in Central Europe.

Mr. MATLOCK. Just briefly, on General Odom's comments, I don't think that the German position is nearly as unequivocal as he has described it; certainly on the part of some it is, but they are having much the same debate that we are. And when I go to German-American meetings, I find that you have sometimes more Germans arguing against the immediate expansion—

Mr. ODOM. A return of a weakened Germany and nobody oppose it.

Mr. MATLOCK. Well, we may not talk to the same people. It is not my understanding that necessarily it is that unequivocal. I know what their official position is: the Kohl Government is in favor of expansion. I don't see evidence that the fears that General Odom mentioned are real fears. I really don't. On this, obviously, our judgment differs.

On the purposes of NATO, I totally agree with General Odom that the sole purpose was never just to defend from the East, and that is why it is important to preserve NATO. And it has these other purposes, and expansion under the right circumstances might well enhance these purposes. I don't deny that. But I think that under some circumstances it could make it more difficult.

But I do see NATO alive; I see it changing its missions; I see so far a very successful cooperation in Bosnia, so that I think NATO is alive and reasonably well off, and that is another reason I don't see the urgency.

Now, the general has said there will never be any time that some Russians won't be against NATO. That is probably true, and I am not talking about some Russians. There will never be a time when everybody agrees on basic issues in any country. All I said was I do think that there is still plenty of opportunity to negotiate an arrangement whereby the Russian public as a whole will not be induced to think that this is essentially an anti-Russian thing, and I think more can be done there.

Finally, on the urgency, again I will just repeat, I don't see the arguments. I am not sure that Russia's turn toward the so-called neoimperialism is more than rhetorical. There have been disturbing rhetorical statements, I admit. But, you know, back when we were dealing with the Soviet Union, and I would remind the committee that in that period I was considered a hardliner among hardliners, at that time we used to talk about capabilities, to say, look, we can never determine intentions very clearly, let's look at

capabilities. And the fact is, Russia does no longer, in my opinion, have the capability of being an imperial power in the sense of projecting its empire or acquiring an empire abroad by military pressure. And certainly, vis-a-vis the outside, one of the purposes of NATO, not the only one, but one, was to protect its members from an outside threat. It is the outside threat that right now is absent.

Now, as far as Finlandization of Central Europe is concerned, I just don't see the tendencies that that would happen, but I would also say, Finland is not that terrible an example. Finland has done pretty well. Finland was able to defend itself. It sits right next to Russia, it has come into the EU, and it doesn't feel that it needs to be in NATO to secure its security. I think that is correct.

Finally, just one point that I may have left out. I didn't say that NATO expansion would automatically make EU inclusion impossible. What I said was, I have the impression, and I do have this impression, Mr. Chairman, that some of our NATO allies would like to push ahead with NATO expansion and then sit back and delay the very difficult economic decisions regarding access to markets, the sort of decisions they would have to make in bringing the Central and Eastern Europeans into the European Union.

I also feel that membership in the European Union would not only provide security guarantees implicitly, but would provide the concrete assistance in developing their economies that the Central and East European countries very much need, so that I do think that is something we should bear in mind. In my opinion, the Central Europeans from every point of view need the EU more than they need NATO guarantees, though NATO guarantees alone, if that is what they require, can be arranged without stimulating a negative Russian reaction.

Mr. LEACH. [Presiding.] Let me say, I had some further questions, but we have a major time constraint. This is a bill. It implies there is a vote followed by a series of votes, and so what I would like to do, if it is amenable to the panel, is bring this to a close and thank all three of you for bringing a great variety of views. Some of them there has been obvious difference of opinion upon, but thank you all for distinguished public service as well.

If I can, I would like to impanel the third panel and allow the beginning of testimony, and then we will break for the vote. Thank you very much.

Our third panel consists of two witnesses speaking for broad-based coalitions representing Americans of Central and Eastern European descent. The first witness is Mr. Frank Koszorus Jr., who is affiliated with the Hungarian American Coalition, but is appearing before us today as a spokesman for the Central and East European Coalition.

The Central and East European Coalition is made up of 18 national grassroots groups. Among them are the Polish-American Congress, the Hungarian American Coalition, the National Federation of American Hungarians, and the Czecho-Slovak Council of America. The coalition also includes such groups as the Slovak World Congress, the American Latvian Association, the Armenian Assembly of America, the Congress of Romanian Americans, the Estonian American National Council, the Joint Baltic American

National Committee, the Lithuanian American Council, and the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America.

Our second witness is Mr. Richard H. Kosinski, who is Treasurer of the Federation of Polish Americans, but is appearing before us today as the spokesman for the National Confederation of American Ethnic Groups, Incorporated.

The National Confederation includes 11 American heritage groups from Central and Eastern Europe, ranging from the Federation of Polish Americans to the Slovak League of America and Lithuanian American Council.

I apologize for all of the groups I haven't included in these definitions, but the two of you are most welcome. I also apologize for the convoluted nature of what is about to appear, because your testimony is to begin, and then we are going to break, and the break will probably be at least of a half-hour duration.

Mr. Koszorus, why don't you begin, please.

#### **STATEMENT OF FRANK KOSZORUS, JR., CENTRAL AND EAST EUROPEAN COALITION**

Mr. KOSZORUS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I am pleased to be with you this afternoon to discuss the importance of NATO enlargement and to express the Central and East European Coalition's support for the NATO Enlargement Facilitation Act of 1996, which we believe will facilitate the enlargement of the Alliance and serve vital geopolitical interests of the United States.

Mr. Chairman, I request that our written statement and the attachment thereto be included in the record.

Mr. LEACH. Without objection, so ordered. And the same will apply to Mr. Kosinski.

Mr. KOSZORUS. The Coalition comprises, as you noted, Mr. Chairman, 18 national grassroots organizations representing 22 million Americans who trace their heritage to that part of the world.

The Coalition strongly believes that the long-term national security and fiscal interests of the United States require a strong commitment to the transition of Central and East European countries to fully democratic and free-market nations. That commitment requires an active U.S. engagement in that part of the world.

Now, this morning and early afternoon, we have heard considerable testimony and questions about the costs of this commitment.

In this century alone, the United States was called upon to fight two World Wars and a 45-year cold war—conflicts which emanated from the heart of Europe—in furtherance of our geopolitical interests. Both the institutionalization of democracy and market economies in Central and Eastern Europe and the prevention of any large power dominating any part of Europe are the best means of guaranteeing that there will be no further European conflicts which will entangle the United States.

We believe that with the collapse of communism and the Soviet Union, the objectives of peace, stability and democracy in Europe are achievable. Success, however, requires continued engagement, support and assistance of the United States and the West. Admittedly, that support involves significant costs. Nevertheless, such costs pale in comparison to the costs in terms of lives and treasure

that we Americans have had to incur this century as we protect our interests in Europe.

Among the most visible forms of our engagement is our involvement in the security issues of the region. We believe that the general stability and security of the region can best be accomplished through the expansion of NATO.

The coalition endorses H.R. 3564 because it addresses the heretofore glacial pace of NATO's expansion. The collapse of the Soviet Union has left a dangerous security vacuum in Central and Eastern Europe. That region must be rapidly reintegrated with the West to provide it with a sense of security and to shore up the new democracies. Rapid expansion of NATO to include countries which are committed to the concepts of democracy, market economies, civilian control of the military, and human and minority rights would serve this objective, as well as the foreign policy interests of the United States, by ensuring Europe's overall stability.

In January 1994, the Clinton administration committed itself to the integration of the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe into the defensive structure of the Atlantic community. More than 2 years later, the questions posed by the President, when the process of NATO enlargement will begin, and who will join, remain largely unanswered.

If the unanimous decision of the 16 NATO allies and ratification of their respective Parliaments are to be achieved when the Alliance finally begins to consider new members, the United States must now take the initiative and unequivocally support its commitment.

We must not permit Central and Eastern Europe to languish in a security vacuum. Russian interests are not threatened by the expansion of a defensive alliance. Moreover, stability and economic growth on the borders of Russia can only benefit Moscow. In fact, Mr. Chairman, I believe NATO has already expanded when the two Germanys united. And, in fact, that expansion has not threatened Russia; it has benefited Russia considering the significant assistance Germany has provided Russia.

Russia should not be isolated, and mechanisms such as a treaty between NATO and Russia or a permanent body to implement security arrangements on the continent should dispel any lingering concerns Moscow may entertain about an enlarged NATO. Russia, however, should under no circumstances be permitted to veto NATO's enlargement.

Western indecisiveness will encourage Russian nationalists to assert expansionist tendencies and cause the United States and the West to lose credibility. Moreover, since 1990 there has been no apparent response to Russia's escalating threats relating to the enlargement of the Alliance.

We, the Coalition, recognize that the expansion of NATO will proceed—

Mr. LEACH. I would like to ask you to suspend for a moment, and I apologize, because this is one of the most thoughtful statements the committee has received.

We have 5 minutes for a vote, and so I am going to ask for a recess at this time. But at that point I want you to continue with your statement, and then we will turn to Mr. Kosinski.

I also want to express an apology that I have a long-standing personal commitment that is going to interrupt, and so there will be a new Chair when we return. But I expect this recess to be at least 30 minutes, and again, I apologize for the discombobulation of the circumstance, and particularly because of the depth of feeling that I know is represented on these statements. There are issues and issues before Congress, and this is a very profound one. So the committee will stand in recess subject to the vote.

[Recess 12:40 p.m. to 1:20 p.m.]

Chairman GILMAN. The committee will come to order.

Mr. Koszorus, would you be kind enough to continue with your testimony. I regret the interruption due to the votes.

Mr. KOSZORUS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I fully understand.

We recognize that the expansion of NATO will proceed in stages. Although this should not result in a division of Central and Eastern Europe into protected and unprotected countries, the process must at long last begin. NATO should remain open to states emerging from Communist domination which are not included in the first stage of enlargement.

There has been considerable discussion regarding drawing lines in Europe and that the effect of enlarging NATO would, in fact, draw new lines. The Coalition, however, believes that continued Western hesitation in enlarging NATO and in failing to respond to Russian threats will redraw the lines imposed by Stalin and signal Russian expansionists that they, in fact, enjoy a sphere of influence in Central and Eastern Europe.

The consequences of such an action would be contrary to U.S. geopolitical interests in a stable, secure, integrated and democratic Europe. Enlargement of NATO to include countries which desire to join the Alliance and meet the criteria of NATO membership is an inexpensive, yet vital, insurance policy for the United States.

H.R. 3564 and its Senate counterpart are welcome first steps in this direction. We commend Chairman Gilman and the other members of the committee for their leadership in introducing this important bill. We hope that this bill will receive substantial bipartisan support in both chambers, as well as support of the President.

The passage of these bills must be followed by concrete steps, eligibility lists, criteria, and unambiguous timetables for NATO enlargement in 1996-1997. As we approach the 21st century, we simply cannot afford to squander a historic opportunity to safeguard peace and democracy. With vision and leadership, we will not have to pose the question, who lost Central and Eastern Europe the second time this century?

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Koszorus.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Koszorus appears in the appendix.]

Chairman GILMAN. I am pleased to ask Richard Kosinski if he would present his testimony. You may either present the entire statement or summarize, whichever you deem appropriate.

#### **STATEMENT OF RICHARD H. KOSINSKI, NATIONAL CONFEDERATION OF AMERICAN ETHNIC GROUPS, INCORPORATED**

Mr. KOSINSKI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I am here today to endorse wholeheartedly H.R. 3564, the NATO Enlargement and Facilitation Act of 1996, as introduced on June 4th by you, Mr. Chairman, and several distinguished members of this committee from both sides of the aisle, including Mr. Bereuter, Mr. Gejdenson, Mr. Hyde, Mr. Leach, Mr. Smith, Mr. Torricelli, Mr. Brownback, Mr. Kim, Mr. Gallegly, and Mr. King.

May I just express our appreciation to you, sir, and the original cosponsoring members for the splendid work done on this legislation and for including us in the review of this very crucial bill concerning NATO alliance expansion.

The issue is of utmost importance to the membership of our organization and those others under the umbrella of the National Confederation of American Ethnic Groups, Inc., including 11 American ethnic heritage groups from Central and Eastern Europe, and I refer you to the attachment which includes the listing of the members and their various constituencies.

Our unambiguous support for H.R. 3564 is based on the following reasons: First, it is our contention that a security vacuum prevails in the region of Central and Eastern Europe, notwithstanding the existence of the Partnership for Peace program. PFP is a vehicle for limited military cooperation and liaison, offering no military guarantees or meaningful military integration. In the words of the late Secretary of Defense, Les Aspin, on December 3, 1993, this policy does not provide for: NATO Article V security guarantees which state that an attack on one member of the Alliance is considered to be an attack on all; that automatic membership at a later time for the signatories; or anything other than consultations in the event that the security of one of its participants is threatened.

In addition, PFP includes the Russian Federation which is the potential or possible danger to the security of the region.

PFP, as conceived, was at a minimum a placebo for regional fears and, at best, a limited process to increase military cooperation with the regional armed forces by international exercises. This basic definition remains unchanged no matter how intense these contacts become.

Second: while we would like to see a number of Central and Eastern European countries to be admitted to NATO, the focus of this legislation and our interest is in initiating the formal expansion process.

Although we appreciate the significance of Secretary of State Warren Christopher's Prague speech of March 20, 1996, for reaffirming the conceptual framework and displaying a heretofore absent political will on the part of the Administration with regard to Alliance expansion, we must state unambiguously that despite these statements, the formal expansion process has not yet been started.

Starting the formal expansion process consistent with Articles X and II of the Washington Treaty requires an official invitation to one, or several of European States which are in a position to promote the principles of the treaty and enhance the security of the North Atlantic area. Such an invitation has not yet been issued, and according to the June 3rd statement by White House spokesman Mike McCurry, the Administration expects NATO to follow a timetable, "that 'goes out' through 1996 and 1997, as they look at

the question of who might then become potential members for the Alliance”.

It is our belief that H.R. 3564 comes closest to providing the crucial missing element in current U.S. policy by identifying one of the two components which constitute the first step in actually expanding the Alliance, namely the identification of which countries are, today, qualified to enter into accession negotiations. We urge the members of this committee to also address a timetable by which these negotiations are to occur.

Third: it is our contention that while such a step would not exclude any other countries of the region, it must be recognized that close historical, political, cultural and economic links exist between the Atlantic community and Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic. Democracy has deep roots in these societies, and one needs only to cite as evidence for this the Polish Constitution of 1791, the first parliamentary government in Hungary in 1848, and the democratic credentials of the Czechoslovak Republic after 1918. It should also be recalled that the transfer of power and the dates of free elections in these three countries were realized as a result of momentous “roundtable” negotiations in Poland in spring of 1989, followed by the self-dissolution of the one-party Hungarian Parliament in October 1989, and the “velvet revolution” in Prague in November of that year.

All three governments support their respective accession to NATO and enjoy substantial support toward this goal on the part of their countrymen. They consider themselves part of the Atlantic community and have made substantial progress toward restructuring their economies and societies.

Fourth: we contend that identification of these countries, as this legislation does, and starting the formal accession process would advance the aspirations of other variously qualified states, like the three Baltic Republics, Slovenia, the Slovak Republic, Romania, Croatia and others in the region, for NATO membership, in spite of dire warnings of those who would like to delay Alliance expansion indefinitely by employing excuses.

What is more discouraging, not to initiate the expansion process at all, or not being included in the first round? While it might have been useful as a cautious outreach measure, the PFP process could and will not, of course, be a substitute for the actual accession protocol. Our concerns in this regard are predicated on the following aspects of the current policy:

One, no apparent distinction exists among the 27 countries of PFP, including those named as eligible in this legislation as well as, for instance, Russia and the Central Asian Republics, which have neither expressed interest nor are being considered for first- or second-tier entry. How can, under these circumstances, PFP accommodate the underlying proposition of NATO expansion?

Two: There is a de facto linkage between Alliance expansion, as distinct from PFP implementation, to events in the Russian Federation despite categorical assurances to the contrary. The question of identifying first-tier candidates was and still is being deferred because of the Russian electoral process. This was evident at both the December 1995 and June 1996 meetings of NATO ministers.

Indeed, progress on the present bill and its Senate equivalent continue to be affected by the same factors. It is our understanding that passage might not be secured before the second round of the Russian Presidential election slated, as recent media reports indicate, as early as July 3rd. Mr. Chairman, we strongly urge a mark-up of the bill in this committee and an early floor vote on H.R. 3564.

Three: Taking the requisite steps toward initiation of the formal accession process is portrayed as rushing the issue by the Administration. The record shows that the basic formula of partnership outreach to the States of Central and Eastern Europe, in fact, dates from mid-1991, or 5 years ago, when the North Atlantic Council in its June 6 and 7, 1991 Copenhagen communique outlined the outreach program entitled "Partnership with the Countries of Central and Eastern Europe." These policy principles, in an expanded form, were adopted by the Administration in 1993 as Partnership for Peace.

At this time, with the approval of the Chairman, I would like to introduce for the record a copy of the document entitled "Partnership with the Countries of Central and Eastern Europe".

Chairman GILMAN. We would be pleased to accept it, without objection.

Mr. KOSINSKI. Thank you.

[The information referred to appears in the appendix.]

Mr. KOSINSKI. Although the NATO Ministerial Council has since repeatedly declared NATO expansion as its policy, senior State Department sources admit that they have only recently initiated an intense dialog with the other 15 Alliance member governments in order to forge a consensus as to the who and when of Alliance expansion. What, except rhetoric, did they undertake after the publication of the study on NATO enlargement in September 1995, which identified expansion parameters, and the December NATO ministerial meeting?

Under these circumstances, how can Mike McCurry even liken NATO to a country club which could be joined in an afternoon? Are 5 years not sufficient to at least start the negotiations?

Moreover, enunciation of this policy of outreach in 1991 coincides with what has been reported to be a tacit agreement not to expand the Alliance into Central and Eastern Europe. According to testimony given by former Ambassador John Matlock before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on May 3, 1995, such an arrangement was part of the negotiations concerning German reunification. If, in fact, the lineage of PFP is associated with that event, as the timing suggests, our uncertainty about the meaning of the delayed start of Alliance expansion would grow to alarm.

For these reasons we regard PFP as utterly insufficient, and we urge the committee and the House of Representatives to enact H.R. 3564 as soon as possible.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Kosinski, and I want to thank Mr. Koszorus, too, for both of your statements in support of our proposal. It's good to know that we have broad-based support out there.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Kosinski appears in the appendix.]

Chairman GILMAN. I would like to ask you about that. One question we all have is whether the strong support you have expressed here for enlarging NATO is reflective of grassroots sentiment within your organizations, or is that just top-level reflection? To put the question another way, is this something that the individual members of your organizations raise on their own with you, or is it something that you are raising with them?

Mr. KOSZORUS. Speaking on behalf of the Coalition, I can assure you, Mr. Chairman, that this is an issue of vital interest to our membership. It is always raised at our meetings, our board meetings, and our joint meetings. As Americans, our members are very concerned with advancing vital U.S. geopolitical interests. They are also concerned with maintaining and promoting the independence of the newly emerging democracies. They believe that enlargement of NATO and an overall security system will certainly advance both of these interests.

Speaking on behalf of my specific organization, the Hungarian American Coalition, I can also tell you that we have members who left Hungary in 1956. They know oppression and foreign domination firsthand; they left as Soviet tanks were rolling into Budapest. So they are concerned about NATO enlargement, and they understand the adverse consequences of the Soviet Union's armed intervention in 1956 with respect to both U.S. and European strategic interests.

Mr. KOSINSKI. Well, I think that it is very true that this is a grassroots movement. There was a symposium which the Confederation held on April 26, and it was the unanimous view of all of the members who participated in the symposium that NATO enlargement was absolutely necessary, both for the security of the United States as well as the security of the countries involved, particularly the three that are mentioned in the legislation.

When I, as a member of the Federation for Polish Americans, when I walk the streets of Connecticut where I am from, and I talk to people about the issues that really affect them, constantly the issue of NATO comes up. Often on the streets it is talked about all the time. Many of the Polish American groups which I am familiar with have written letters, have contacted Members of Congress in the area to discuss the issue.

Very frankly, it was a surprise to have Mr. Gejdenson become a cosponsor, but it was as a result of the grassroots effort in Connecticut that that occurred, because I don't think Mr. Gejdenson in the past had been viewed as particularly sympathetic to these types of things. But Mr. Gejdenson heard from a lot of people, and I think he reflected on how important it was to the Polish American community in Connecticut and came on board as a cosponsor, and we are very happy to have that.

Chairman GILMAN. I am pleased to hear about that broad-based support.

One concern that we had in putting together this measure on NATO enlargement was a possible complaint that by singling out Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, the bill would undermine the interests of some of the other countries in Central and Eastern

Europe, for example, such as Slovakia, the Baltic States, Romania and Ukraine. But I notice that in your testimony supporting the bill, both of you profess to be speaking on behalf of organizations of Americans descended from countries that are not in the bill's first tier.

Do we get good, strong support from Americans from those countries as well, and from those organizations representing those countries that are not in the first tier?

Mr. KOSZORUS. Mr. Chairman, our 18 national grassroots organizations enthusiastically support this bill. They unanimously believe that the bill does not preclude others from joining the process.

The important thing for our organization is that the process begin. Our member organizations realize that membership proceed in stages, and as long as the process remains open for others, they enthusiastically and unanimously support the bill. There is no question about that.

Chairman GILMAN. Mr. Kosinski.

Mr. KOSINSKI. Well, I think that there is such frustration over the delays that have occurred that all of the member countries that are represented in the Confederation are just looking for something to happen somewhere, sometime, with some countries. And I think everybody recognizes that Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, because of the efforts that they started in 1989, have advanced quite a bit in the forming of the democratic institutions, and I think the other country representatives understand that.

What they think is, this would be the breakthrough. Once the large dam has burst, and any country is named, no matter what country, then that will lead to a role which will allow eventually these other countries to become members, maybe not on the first tier, but possibly on the second or third tier.

So I think all of the countries realize that there has to be some breakthrough, and that Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic are the countries that might start the process to alleviate all of this frustration which exists among all of the representatives among all of the countries.

Chairman GILMAN. Well, again, I want to thank Mr. Koszorus and Mr. Kosinski for your testimony and your support. I hope that you would urge your membership to reach out to our colleagues throughout the House so that we can move this bill at an early date, and we welcome your having taken the time and having the patience to be with us today.

The committee stands adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 1:40 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]



# APPENDIX

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## OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN BENJAMIN A. GILMAN HEARING ON U.S. POLICY TOWARD NATO ENLARGEMENT June 20, 1996

The Committee will come to order. I scheduled this hearing to review U.S. policy toward enlargement of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The need to adapt NATO to the post-Cold War era is one of the greatest national security challenges we face.

NATO is widely recognized as the principal instrument by which the United States and our Allies defeated communism and ended the Cold War. But NATO's other major accomplishments are no less important. For almost 50 years, NATO has successfully kept the peace in Europe, while at the same time providing a fertile environment for democracy to take root in such countries as Germany, Italy, Spain, and Turkey.

The emerging democracies of Central and Eastern Europe now look to NATO to do for them what it did for the countries that had the good fortune to be located on the West side of the Iron Curtain when NATO was established in 1949. These newly free countries seek the same insurance against threats to their independence and the same fertile environment for democracy to take root that NATO has provided in the West for almost 50 years.

The challenge of NATO enlargement was first taken up by President Bush, who in 1992 led the effort to establish the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, the first institutional linkage between NATO and the emerging democracies of Central and Eastern Europe.

President Clinton has gone further, gaining the commitment of our NATO Allies in principle to eventual enlargement of the Alliance, and establishing the Partnership for Peace, a forum for enhanced military and political cooperation between NATO and potential candidates for membership.

But many of us in the Congress are concerned that the Administration has moved too slowly, and with insufficient enthusiasm for NATO enlargement. The Partnership for Peace, which initially was billed as a bridge to NATO membership, has come to look more like a detour.

The Congress has sought repeatedly over the last two years to spur the Administration to greater action. A bill I introduced two years ago, enacted as the "NATO Participation Act of 1994", authorized the President to provide transition assistance to leading candidates for admission to the Alliance. President Clinton chose not to use this authority, apparently because he did not want to identify the leading candidates for admission.

So we in Congress acted again. As part of the Contract With America, the House passed legislation last year to mandate establishment of a program to assist the transition to full NATO membership of specified countries in Central and Eastern Europe.

In a further effort to spur the Administration, last year's Foreign Operations Appropriations Act made technical improvements to the NATO Participation Act and called on the President to designate within 60 days the first countries to receive NATO transition assistance.

I wrote the President last February to urge him to comply with this provision. In particular, I recommended that he designate, at a minimum, Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic as eligible to receive NATO transition assistance under the NATO Participation Act.

(over)

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But in a response to me dated May 9, 1996, President Clinton declined to designate any countries. He argued that some countries might be discouraged if they were left off the initial list of designated countries. It's better not to designate anyone if you can't designate everyone, the President seemed to be saying.

I can understand that argument, but it is clear to many of us that if NATO expansion has to wait until everyone who wants to come in is ready to come in, we'll be waiting for a long time.

It is obvious to me that the interest of all countries that want to join NATO is served by getting the process going now. Some countries will be disappointed that they are not in the first tier of countries admitted to the Alliance, but they still will be better off -- and they will get into NATO faster -- than they would if the enlargement process remained stalled.

In yet another effort to spur the Administration, former Senator Dole and I introduced bipartisan legislation on June 4th entitled the "NATO Enlargement Facilitation Act of 1996". Former Polish President Lech Walesa (VA-WEN-SA) joined us in the Capitol to announce our introduction of the legislation, and he warmly endorsed our efforts.

I am pleased to report that our House bill, H.R. 3564, now has 28 cosponsors, including 11 Members of the minority. I look forward to marking up that legislation in this Committee in the near future, and I hope to complete House action on it prior to the August recess.

Testimony of  
 Senior Deputy Assistant Secretary of State  
 for European and Canadian Affairs  
 Rudolf V. Perina  
 on  
 U.S. Policy toward NATO Enlargement  
 Committee on International Relations  
 House of Representatives  
 June 20, 1996

Mr. Chairman, I welcome this opportunity to appear before your committee to describe the progress we've made toward strengthening NATO.

NATO remains the foundation of American policy in Europe. It is the essential organization for peace on the continent. Two weeks ago in Berlin, Secretary Christopher and his Alliance counterparts approved a sweeping new program to deal with the challenges of the new era.

NATO is adapting internally. It is assuming new roles and missions. And it is projecting its strength outward, both through innovative programs such as the Partnership for Peace (PFP) and by taking in new members. Viewed together, this truly constitutes a new NATO which will serve a broad range of American political and security interests well into the next century.

An essential aspect of the new NATO is the welcoming of new members into the Alliance. I am aware, Mr. Chairman, of your considerable personal efforts in support of our policy on NATO enlargement and I greatly value your views on how to achieve our mutual objective. We are well on track to strengthening the Alliance through the addition of new members. Working in cooperation with you and the U.S. Congress, with our Allies and their parliaments, and with the prospective new members themselves, we can and will accomplish this historic feat.

In this context, the Administration welcomes the efforts you have led to build bipartisan support for the President's policy of enlargement. The legislation which you recently co-sponsored represents a significant opportunity to build Congressional support for enlargement. Indeed, we believe our objective should be to come up with a bill which wins the support of large majorities in both Houses -- and, in particular, 67 votes in the Senate -- and we look forward to working with you towards this end.

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Our basic policy -- as set forth by President Clinton in a recent letter to you, Mr. Chairman -- is that by taking in new members from among Europe's new democracies, NATO can help lock in the very substantial progress these states have made in instituting political and economic reforms. NATO's enlargement will serve to erase the illegitimate lines drawn during the Cold War and provide the security underpinning for a growing, undivided transatlantic community. NATO enlargement will ensure a more stable and secure Europe and thus a more secure United States.

At this Administration's initiative, NATO began a process in January 1994 that will result in the admission of new members to the Alliance. Since then, we have made clear progress. We have moved smoothly from definition of the "why" and "how" of enlargement to a second phase of detailed examination of the candidacies of fifteen countries. We have done so in a manner which reflects the very substantial security commitments and the many practical preparations necessarily involved in admitting new members to NATO. And, on the basis of our work within the Alliance and the recently concluded Berlin NATO ministerial, we have a clear sense of the way ahead.

Before reviewing our overall strategy for enlarging NATO, I want to update you and the committee on where the enlargement process now stands.

The enlargement process we launched at the January 1994 NATO Summit has been remarkably successful. At that Summit -- and at President Clinton's personal urging -- the Alliance committed itself to enlarge. At the same time, NATO leaders launched another U.S. initiative, the Partnership for Peace (PFP), whose dual objective is to help prepare our new PFP partners for possible NATO membership, while at the same time creating a long-term mechanism for linking the Alliance to those states which might not join NATO early or at all.

Given the tremendous success of the PFP program in its inaugural year, by December 1994 -- again at U.S. initiative -- NATO foreign ministers were able to take a decision to move the enlargement process a step further by launching a detailed study of NATO enlargement.

Last fall, precisely on schedule, NATO completed this study of the rationale and mechanisms for enlargement and presented the results to our Partners throughout Europe and the New Independent States. The study was welcomed by our Partners, who recognized it both as a significant step forward for the Alliance and as an important contribution to their own efforts to prepare for possible NATO membership.

Let me emphasize here that the enlargement study achieved three very important results:

- it reconfirmed, in practical terms, Allied endorsement of and commitment to the U.S. vision of early NATO enlargement;
- it reaffirmed to our Partners that enlargement was on track, reassuring them that NATO's January 1994 decision would be carried out sooner rather than later; and
- it declared to all that enlargement was going to happen, that no non-member, including Russia, would have a veto over the accession of new members to NATO, and that the terms of NATO membership were not subject to negotiation.

In December 1995, shortly after release of the study, NATO agreed to move into the second phase of the enlargement process. This current phase consists of intensified preparations by both NATO and aspiring members for assuming the rights and fulfilling the obligations of NATO membership. In practice, this means voluntary, individual dialogues with NATO and intensified practical preparations, conducted nationally and through the Partnership for Peace.

The individual consultations between Allies and Partners on enlargement are addressing the full range of political, military and financial issues entailed in membership in NATO. Fifteen Partners (Albania, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Ukraine) are thus far participating in this phase of intensified preparation. Most of these have already submitted "discussion papers" and have thus begun their own individual dialogues; all of them have participated in collective sessions on issues such as NATO's defense review process, NATO's common-funded budgets, NATO standardization policy and the responsibilities of the major NATO commands.

While participation in these dialogues will not guarantee an invitation to join NATO (and, in fact, Ukraine and Finland have stated they are not now seeking membership), completion of this phase of the enlargement process will be a critical element in NATO's deliberations on the "who" and "when" of enlargement.

Allies have agreed that this phase of the enlargement process will run through most of this year, and that our Foreign Ministers will determine next steps at their December 1996 ministerial meeting in Brussels.

Decisions will have to be made by the Alliance as a whole, but this Administration's approach to the December meeting is clear. As Secretary Christopher recently told his Central European counterparts in Prague, NATO will decide on next steps in December of this year; the Alliance must not and will not keep new democracies in the waiting room forever. This message was reinforced at the June 3 Berlin ministerial, where foreign ministers reaffirmed the Alliance's commitment to enlargement, reviewed the status of the intensified dialogues, and restated their commitment to take the next steps in the NATO enlargement process in December. Secretary General Solana has predicted that accession talks with the first group of prospective new members will begin next year.

Throughout this process, the Administration has been pursuing a comprehensive strategy to ensure that enlargement succeeds. The first element for success lies in building and maintaining a durable Allied consensus in support of steady progress toward enlargement. Admission of any new member to NATO, precisely because of the seriousness of the security commitments involved, must have the full support of all of its current members; it cannot be a unilateral effort.

Our success to date is directly attributable to our ability to link progress on enlargement with the individual views and interests of our Allies, most of whom will face a parliamentary ratification process similar to ours.

A second element in our comprehensive strategy is to place NATO enlargement in the context of a broad, balanced and integrated approach to increasing stability and security throughout the transatlantic area by building a cooperative security structure in Europe. This includes a revitalized NATO, which we achieved in Berlin, thus laying a necessary foundation for further steps on enlargement. It also includes support for enlargement of the European Union, strengthening the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), a strong and productive relationship between the Alliance and Russia, and enhanced cooperation with other states not immediately aspiring to NATO membership.

In this regard, we are engaged in a continuous dialogue with Moscow on the full range of European security issues -- including NATO enlargement -- but only the Alliance will determine the pace and direction of enlargement. Just two weeks ago in Berlin, Foreign Minister Primakov met with Secretary Christopher and his Alliance counterparts as part of our ongoing "16+1" dialogue with Russia. Our goal is to build on the solid cooperation between NATO forces and Russia

currently taking place on the ground in Bosnia. We will continue our efforts to develop a more formal, long-term relationship between Russia and the Alliance. Russia has an important role to play in the new Europe -- as Secretary Christopher has said, the door to European integration is open to Moscow -- but it's up to Russia to decide to step through it. At this point let me state definitively: our comprehensive approach to enlargement does not include any sort of secret deal with the Russians. Period.

Let me also note here that Ukraine's emergence as a sovereign and prosperous democracy is especially important to the security of Europe. That is why we value Ukraine's participation in IFOR and PFP, and why we support the further development of an enhanced NATO-Ukraine relationship.

A third element critical for the success of our strategy is encouraging prospective members to prepare seriously for the full range of political, military and financial responsibilities they will need to assume if and when they become members. Admission to NATO is a solemn undertaking for both NATO and aspiring members, involving the most serious commitment nations can undertake: the obligation to defend each other.

Aspiring allies need to prepare for these and other obligations. NATO, too, faces a major task in organizing and preparing itself for enlargement and we have thus, as part of enlargement's ongoing second phase, already begun a comprehensive review of the internal adjustments NATO must make to admit new Allies. This review will consider -- and lead to -- necessary adjustments in command structure, force posture, roles and missions, cost-sharing and NATO staffing. But, as the enlargement study has indicated, the Alliance does not foresee the requirement for the stationing of conventional or nuclear forces on the territory of new members.

Finally, and to their great credit, let me emphasize that Partners have not waited to be identified as eligible for membership before undertaking the basic reforms and preparations the enlargement study made clear they must pursue. The prospect of NATO membership has proven to be the most powerful incentive for reform and resolution of ethnic or territorial conflict we can offer aspiring members.

For example, recent improvement in civilian control of the military in Poland, and in relations between Hungary and its neighbors are in large part attributable to those countries' desire to join NATO.

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We firmly believe that our comprehensive strategy is the best means for carrying NATO's enlargement process through to a successful conclusion. Each of the three elements of our approach complements the others and each is helping us to erase the Cold War lines of confrontation that divided Europe. Only in this way can we take new members into our Alliance without redrawing these lines.

Proof that our strategy is working can be seen in the already significant improvement in the ability of Partner forces to undertake joint missions with NATO.

In Bosnia, for example, twelve Partner states (Austria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Russia, Sweden, Ukraine) are working alongside NATO forces in IFOR, and they are doing a superb job. Romanian troops, for example, are engaged in the very necessary -- but also very dangerous -- task of clearing land mines.

To conclude, Mr. Chairman, this Administration is absolutely committed to continued close cooperation with you and the rest of the Congress to ensure that our Partners have every opportunity to become members of NATO.

We welcome your efforts to build solid bipartisan Congressional support for both the continuing engagement of the United States in Europe and for this Administration's commitment to bringing new members into the Alliance.

As Secretary Christopher said during his March visit to Prague, "we are determined to keep faith with the nations of this region, to open the door that Stalin shut when he said no to the Marshall Plan. No nation in Europe should ever again be consigned to a buffer zone between great powers, or relegated to another nation's sphere of influence."

The states of Central and Eastern Europe, our PFP Partners, have repeatedly expressed complete understanding and full support for the the NATO enlargement process we have created. As recently as the Secretary's June 3 meeting in Berlin, they welcomed the progress the Alliance has made on enlargement.

We look forward to continuing to work closely with you, your congressional colleagues, and your staffs as we move forward together in the historic task of adding new members to the Alliance.

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Peter W. Rodman  
 "NATO Enlargement: Current Issues"  
 Testimony Prepared for the  
 House International Relations Committee  
 Washington, DC  
 Thursday, June 20, 1996

I want to express my gratitude to the Chairman and the Committee for your courtesy in inviting me to testify, but even more for the crucial leadership you have provided, in both the 103d and the 104th Congress, on the issue of NATO enlargement.

I have long argued that NATO enlargement, properly understood, is not a change in the European situation but a *consolidation* of the new status quo that resulted from the revolutions of 1989 and 1991.<sup>1</sup> The Central European democracies, and also the Baltic republics, Ukraine, and others, are now free and sovereign and independent and have chosen (several of them, at least) to associate with the West. The question now before the West is whether we value this strategic outcome of 1989 and 1991 sufficiently to be prepared to guarantee it.

Two issues -- both related to this central point -- seem to me particularly important today:

- first, the sense of urgency now felt by the Central European democracies. This suggests the danger that the present status quo may unravel if NATO does not reach definitive decisions this year on admitting new members.
- second, the problem of how to deal with the Russians. Amid the turbulence of Russian politics, there have been ambiguous signals confirming that -- if the West shows courage and determination -- Russia is, in the end, likely to acquiesce in NATO enlargement.

Let me deal with these two issues in turn.

#### Time Running Out

It should not be surprising that the specter of Western abandonment haunts the political mind of Central Europeans. They remember Munich; they remember Yalta. Czech President Vaclav Havel, in an address to Parliament on March 12, recalled how his people had already

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<sup>1</sup>See Peter W. Rodman, "4 More for NATO," *Washington Post*, December 13, 1994; "Insuring the future," *Washington Times*, January 22, 1995; "Yalta in the Balkans," *National Review*, December 25, 1995; "Understanding with Moscow," *Washington Post*, January 16, 1996; Prague Spring," *National Review*, May 6, 1996; "Russia and NATO," *National Review*, July 15, 1996 (forthcoming).

experienced the weakness of West European democracy and its concessions to evil: "The danger of another Munich is looming over Europe again," he warned.<sup>2</sup> As he later explained in an interview with *The Economist*, he was lamenting the "excessive caution" shown by the West in its fumbling response to the Yugoslav crisis and, most of all, in its endless procrastination about admitting the new Central European democracies into the North Atlantic Alliance and the European Union. NATO membership, in particular, Havel saw as "a signal that the West truly wants us and sees us as part of the western sphere of civilization."<sup>3</sup> But that signal has not yet been given.

Havel's unease is justified -- and it demonstrates why time is running out. Opponents of NATO enlargement are in the habit of arguing that the present situation in Central Europe is fine -- there's no Russian threat at the moment -- so why take the risks of expanding NATO? the answer is not simply that historical memory teaches that ambiguity about the status of Central Europe is, in the long run, very unhealthy for the peace of Europe. More concrete than that and more immediate is the conclusion that the Central Europeans are drawing from the West's hesitation: They see Russia turning ominously in a nationalist direction, and they see the West seemingly paralyzed by its desire not to "provoke" the Russians.

When Generalissimo Franco died in November 1975, one of the arguments often heard for bringing Spain rapidly into NATO was to bolster Spain's democratic institutions and reinforce its solidarity with the West. Six years later, in December 1981, Spain's admission into the Alliance was proclaimed (ratifications took another six months).<sup>4</sup> Today, nearly seven years have already passed since the revolution of 1989 and no invitation or even schedule exists for Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic or any other country to join the Alliance. The NATO foreign ministers' meeting of last December put off any decisions for at least another year.<sup>5</sup> As for the EU, its summit in Madrid last December refused to set a date for even the beginning of talks with the Central Europeans on membership.<sup>6</sup> The failure of both the EU and NATO to embrace them by this late date is surely one of the factors contributing to the demoralization and discrediting of the

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<sup>2</sup>Havel address to Czech Parliament, March 12, 1996, in FBIS-EEU-96-050, 13 March 1996, pp. 12-13.

<sup>3</sup>"Havel's reminder to the West," *The Economist*, March 30, 1996, p. 50.

<sup>4</sup>See Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty on the Accession of Spain, Brussels, December 10, 1981, in U.S. Department of State, *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1981* (Washington: Department of State, 1984), docs. 196-197, pp. 534-535.

<sup>5</sup>Final Communiqué of the North Atlantic Council meeting at NATO Headquarters, Brussels December 5, 1995, para. 7.

<sup>6</sup>Madrid European Council: Presidency Conclusions, 15-16 December 1995, EU doc/95/9, Section III (A).

pro-Western forces in these societies, and thus the resuscitation of the neo-Communists.

But more is in store: Should it become clear, despite the positive rhetoric, that the West continues to hesitate to take the risks of NATO enlargement, the Central Europeans will not sit still, waiting in the anteroom; they will draw fundamental conclusions. They will conclude that the West is simply unwilling to make a commitment to protect them and that they have no option but to make the best of that situation. They will begin to declare publicly that they really don't need NATO membership all that much (as Bulgaria, for example, has already done). They will drift back into the Russian orbit -- in the guise of "neutrality," which is the Russian preference. The result will be Finlandization of Central Europe and the partial reversal of the outcome of 1989. That will be an extraordinary strategic and moral disaster. It is, of course, still avoidable if NATO takes decisive action this year -- presumably at the December ministerial meeting -- to begin accession negotiations with the leading candidates for membership.

Some in America may ask, what is our stake in these countries? In the 1930s, some in Britain and France asked: Why die for Danzig? Today, Danzig is Gdansk, the shipyard town in Poland where Solidarity was born. The problem is, twice before in this century, the Western democracies realized *after the fact* that, willy-nilly, the instability of Central Europe undermined the security of all of Europe. Should the Central Europeans lose their faith in the Western democracies, and drift back into the Russian orbit, it will only dramatize the restoration of Russian power in the eastern half of the Continent; it will show that once again the European balance of power is up for grabs. The Versailles Conference of 1919 established this belt of small, vulnerable states out of the wreckage of old empires, and since then their fate has been a determinant of all Europe's fate. It is not a matter of choice but a structural reality of European stability.

NATO enlargement is therefore a matter of crisis *prevention* with respect to Central Europe, just as NATO's creation was a matter of crisis prevention with respect to Western Europe. It is to foreclose Russian irredentism and make irreversible the new status quo that resulted from 1989 and 1991. It is simple prudence; the *failure* to do it will turn out to be the more reckless course. And it is not just a favor we do to the Central Europeans, however much they may deserve such a favor.

### Dealing with the Russians

Those of us who advocate rapid admission of the Central Europe democracies into NATO have the burden of demonstrating that it can be done without triggering a major brawl with the Russians and a new Cold War in Europe. This is a strategy for achieving that objective.

Recent comments by Russian leaders suggest a certain rethinking of the issue in Moscow. President Boris Yeltsin and Foreign Minister Yevgenii Primakov have hinted at "compromise." The optimistic interpretation of these signals is that the Russians are bending a bit and no longer

adamant in their opposition to NATO enlargement. The more cynical interpretation is that it's just a clever new tactic to sow confusion and slow down the process. Whatever the correct reading, the time is now approaching for the Alliance to develop a coherent strategy for dealing with the Russians on the matter. If we have such a strategy, we can handle either contingency -- whoever is in charge in Moscow.

The supposed signals of Russian flexibility have taken various forms. President Yeltsin on a visit to Norway in late March cited the model of France under Charles de Gaulle: If the Central Europeans are in the Alliance, the implication was, they do not have to participate in its military organization. Mr. Primakov on several occasions has focused on the unacceptability of NATO's moving troops, weapons (especially nuclear), and other "infrastructure" eastward.<sup>7</sup> On other occasions, Russians have spoken of the Austrian model: NATO could give security guarantees to the Central Europeans, but these should be matched by Russian security guarantees and the result would be a secure neutrality.<sup>8</sup> On yet other occasions, Russians have urged a change in the nature of NATO -- turning it into a political rather than a military organization -- which would presumably make Central European membership more palatable and make NATO an acceptable pillar of a "new European security architecture."

Some of these Russian ideas are mischievous. On the other hand, Russia has some legitimate security concerns that can be addressed. A dialogue with Russia is in order, and in fact is essential to any strategy for enlarging NATO successfully. There are topics that can safely be discussed, and some reassurances that can be given -- but with one crucial proviso: *The Russians must call off the campaign against NATO enlargement.*

What does this mean concretely?

First, there are some restraints that NATO could consider on military dispositions -- if balanced by limitations on the Russian side. Russia can have no say in how NATO defends its own members, but NATO's need for nuclear or conventional deployments in Central Europe depends on the threat that it faces. No one should welcome the wholesale remilitarization of the Central European space that is now free of foreign troops. A discussion of mutual restraint in nuclear deployments in Central Europe, Russia, and Belarus would make sense. Also limits on conventional forces -- again, if balanced by limits on the Russian side. But NATO should never

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<sup>7</sup>E.g., Yeltsin remarks at Oslo airport, March 25, 1996, in *Jamestown Monitor*, Vol. 11, No. 60 (26 March 1996); Primakov remarks to Hungarian Foreign Minister, March 11, 1996, in *OMRI Daily Digest*, No. 51, part 1 (12 March 1996); report on Primakov's first press conference as Foreign Minister, January 12, 1996, in *Krasnaya Zvezda*, 16 January 1996, FBIS-SOV-96-012, 18 January 1996, pp. 31-32.

<sup>8</sup>Private conversations with the author.

give up the right to deploy some small-scale trip-wire force (including Americans if necessary) and the logistical infrastructure needed to make rapid reinforcement possible should restraints break down.

Second, a long-term dialogue or agreement on relations between NATO and Russia is also a legitimate topic for discussion. But talk of "changing the nature" of NATO is a snare and a delusion. NATO is a security organization, not a social club; that is why new applicants want to join it -- and why diluting it has long been an aim of Soviet (and apparently now Russian) foreign policy. That President Clinton seems to have been lured into such a discussion is most disturbing.<sup>9</sup>

Third, any discussion of military restraints must be conditioned on Russian acceptance of NATO enlargement. If Russia keeps up its campaign of intimidation -- and especially if it threatens to "shoot its hostages" (i.e., to brutalize the Baltic states, Ukraine, and others not admitted to NATO in the first wave) -- then we owe Moscow no assurances whatever. In such circumstances, in fact, it would be most unwise for NATO to *refrain* from deploying whatever weapons and forces it deems necessary.

Indeed, no concessions of any kind should be given the Russians for free. Moscow has also expressed interest in joining the G-7 grouping of industrialized nations and in having the Bosnia "Contact Group" (U.S., U.K., France, Germany, Russia) become a continuing consultative body. Some of our allies have already spoken favorably about doing these. Moscow will certainly continue to need financial aid from the West (particularly after the way President Yeltsin has been inflating the economy in his election campaign). The Russians also seek to reopen the CFE agreement because the break-up of the USSR has transformed their security situation. Whether any of these things is a good idea or not -- and there are reasons for the West to be cautious in each case - they should not even be discussed until the Russians have called off the dogs, permanently, on NATO enlargement.

Fourth, the above elements point to a strategy for dealing with the "shooting the hostages" problem. Moscow needs to understand that if it threatens the Balts or Ukraine or others in the interim, the curtain will come down: NATO enlargement will *accelerate*; no restraints on NATO's military dispositions, nuclear or conventional, will apply; relations with the West (including economic) will go down the drain; and Russia's self-isolation will be complete. The Alliance must make all this explicit as soon as possible. Countries not admitted in the first wave will not, by definition, have the Alliance's most solemn defense commitment, but NATO's declaratory policy *must* make clear to the Russians that their bullying of these states will be taken

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<sup>9</sup>See the leaked text of a January 26, 1996, telephone conversation between President Clinton and President Yeltsin, in the Russian journal *Zavtra*, No. 11, March 1996 (FBIS Wire, 14 March 1996), and President Yeltsin's remarks in the joint news conference in Moscow on April 21, 1996.

as an intention to destabilize Europe and the West will react accordingly, across the board.

The West has the leverage here. If a new dividing line thus appears in Europe -- and is remilitarized -- it will be hundreds of miles east of where it used to be, at a time when Russia is broke and has pressing security problems elsewhere, in the Caucasus and Central Asia. Russia should fear this result more than we. In a game of chicken, the West wins if it keeps its nerve.

Thus, what is called for most of all is the determination to proceed, and rapidly. NATO membership will only consolidate what already happened in 1989 and 1991 -- that these countries are sovereign and independent and free to choose their associations. Russians must understand that the outcome of 1989 and 1991 is irreversible. If we are truly determined, realists in Russia will see that NATO membership cannot be stopped and that a beneficial long-term relationship between Russia and NATO presupposes Russian acceptance of it. A crisis will thus be avoided.

This requires an end to Administration hesitations -- no more absurd linkage to the glacial pace of EU enlargement (as in Secretary of State Warren Christopher's January 18 speech at Harvard); no more reassurances to the Russians that NATO enlargement won't happen any time soon (as in countless high-level conversations); no more endless "studies" and "consultations" (as in countless NATO communiqués); no more fear of upsetting the delicate position of "moderates" in the Kremlin, when we should instead be hedging against the nationalistic turn in Russian policy that has already occurred under Yeltsin.

Provided Russia accepts the outcome of 1989 and 1991, there is no objective basis for great-power conflict in Europe. With two-thirds of American troops already gone from Europe, it is absurd for Russians to claim an offensive threat from any of this. The long-term relation between Russia and the West can be benign, and Russia may well become a true partner, depending on its domestic evolution *and* its foreign policy behavior in Europe.

All that is required in the West is some courage now.

TESTIMONY BEFORE THE HOUSE  
COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS  
ON NATO ENLARGEMENT

by Lt Gen (Ret) Wm. E. Odom  
Hudson Institute

20 June 1996

Good morning, Mr. Chairman. It is an honor to appear before your committee and to comment on your legislation concerning NATO enlargement. As you know, I have long been an enthusiastic supporter of an early and limited expansion of NATO into Central Europe, specifically including Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary. I would also support the admission of a number of other countries – Slovenia and the Baltic states – but in light of the general lack of support for including these states, I have concentrated on making the case for just three, those in Central Europe. As my remarks today will indicate, I strongly support your legislation.

My reasoning for enlarging NATO includes most of the popular arguments, but it also involves a somewhat different logic, and it assumes that the risk of NATO forces having to defend against a military attack from the east is trivial. Let me deal first with the prospect of a military threat.

The only country that could conceivably want to invade Central Europe is Russia, and beyond a few extreme voices in Moscow, no serious Russian political leader brandishes that threat. Moreover, the Russian military is not capable of an offensive into Central Europe today, and the fiscal, organizational, and morale obstacles to making it capable are great. That is obvious from the performance of the Russian forces in Chechnya. Overcoming such difficulties will require many years.

At the same time, some of the political forces in Russian parliament and wider public opinion are demanding budgetary allocations to non-military programs at the expense of the Russian ministry of defense. This is a healthy sign. It means that the Russian political process is making it difficult for the Russian military to acquire the resources that it would need to pose a threat to Central Europe.

In the long run, however, we cannot be absolutely sure that things will not change for the worse. If we fail to expand NATO soon, very soon, we will increase the possibilities of things getting worse both in Russian and Central Europe. To suggest that we will contribute to future military dangers by not expanding NATO, of course, is unconventional wisdom. Most opponents of NATO expansion argue that it will anger Russia, re-divide Europe, and make

future conflict more likely. This reasoning, when pressed against the past record in the region, can be seen to get cause and effect reversed. Let me explain.

The real and immediate dangers to Central and Eastern Europe are internal precisely the way they have been internal to former Yugoslavia. Old communists who fear losing power in the Yugoslav successor states have drummed up ethnic animosities that had been dormant for four decades and used virulent nationalism to defend their personal power. Similar vulnerabilities exist in much of Central and Eastern Europe. Large ethnic minorities exist in several of the region's states. Slovakia has well over a half million Hungarians, and Romania has even Hungarians in Transylvania. The Czech Republic and Poland have only trivial minorities, but both expelled large German populations and worry about their return. The Russian enclave of Kaliningrad sits in the north of Poland, and Russia has recently demanded a corridor across Polish territory for access to Kaliningrad. Lithuania has a Polish minority, and Poles are also found in Belarus and the Western Ukraine. Russian minorities live in all the Baltic states. At present, most of these minorities are quiescent, not a political problem. But were democratic transitions in these countries to fail, they almost certainly would become problems.

We tend to forget that all of these countries are relatively new, being created as sovereign states only at the end of WW I. Everyone of them started as parliamentary democracies in the early 1920s. By the mid-1930s, however, all had become dictatorships with strong fascist movements but Czechoslovakia. The great depression contributed to this outcome, but the ethnic, religious, and class fragmentation inside them made them especially vulnerable to political demagoguery.

Another important factor contributed to their failure to survive. Moscow, Berlin, Paris, and London each pursued competitive diplomacy for influence in this region. France cultivated Prague, Bucharest, Belgrade, and Poland against Germany. Germany cultivated Hungary against all its neighbors where large Hungarian minorities lived. Britain was no less active in building anti-German and anti-Soviet ties in East Europe. Moscow sided at first with Berlin, then with Prague and Paris. The Swedes worked to prevent Finland from allying with Estonia, turning Finland into a buffer against the Soviet Union while hinting strongly that it considered the Baltic states within Moscow's sphere. London and Paris favored the Serbs while Germany and Italy favored the Croats as Yugoslavia became unstable. Italy kept a strong hand in Albania. In 1939, of course, Moscow and Berlin secretly agreed to divide the entire region between themselves.

This competitive diplomacy, added to internal fragmentation in these new states, slowly but surely drove Europe toward war. This history is highly relevant today, not because it will repeat itself precisely, but because it reflects deep

structural conditions in the region which still exist to a considerable degree. Some have changed, but others persist. We saw that clearly demonstrated as the French and British reacted to German recognition of Croatia a few years ago by leaping to the side of the Serbs. And the Russians immediately revived the old Slavophile myth about their blood ties to the Serbs. In other words, too many of the old structural conditions and historical memories still exist to discount them as dangers to the region in the coming decade.

This is the real threat to Central and Eastern Europe, not the reappearance of Russian tank armies on the Polish border. Some will argue that the Europeans have learned their lesson from two world wars and will not let it happen again. No doubt they have learned the lesson, but strong reasons exist to doubt that they can prevent it. No single European state is strong enough to dominate the continent and keep the peace. Europe is ruled by an oligarchy of several major powers. Such oligarchies are not unlike economic cartels. All the members have object interests in cooperation, but all have equally compelling interests to cheat. We see that in OPEC. The logic of political power among the major states of Europe is analogous. The rationale for cooperation is compelling but finally not so compelling that the temptation to cheat is wholly removed. The Yugoslav crisis revealed just how quickly even Western European states suspected each other of cheating in efforts to extend their diplomatic influence.

I point out this logic because it was inherently understood in 1948 and 1949 in Western Europe. The French and British wanted NATO and US military presence in Europe primarily because of Germany and the long record of conflicts among the major states of Western Europe. The Soviet threat was not even mentioned in France as NATO's creation was debated. Even in the United States the arguments for the treaty were not based on a Soviet military threat. We were rapidly withdrawing our forces, the Berlin Blockade notwithstanding. The Soviet military threat arose for us only when the Korean War broke out in 1950, a year after NATO was created.

Jean Monnet and Robert Schuman, the authors of French-German economic collaboration in the late 1940s, understood clearly that a US military umbrella over Western Europe was essential if their schemes for French-German economic cooperation were to succeed. In other words, the very conditions we now see in Eastern Europe existed in Western Europe in the late 1940s. We created NATO to limit and contain their potential adverse impact. Even today that function for NATO has not ended. France is coming back into the NATO military structure in no small part because it realizes that it cannot tie down Germany in a common defense and foreign policy within the EU, at least not in the near term. Britain never suffered the French illusion. Both realize, however reluctantly on France's part, that a strong US presence is essential to prevent the dynamics of a political cartel in the EU from breaking down. The

the civilian economies in those countries. They need not be a purely military investment.

Another reason for a slow approach to military integration of these countries into NATO concerns their officer corps. Learning English takes time. It would also be preferable to have a younger and new generation of officers in these states. That will take time. No less important, keeping their officer corps small today makes the maintenance of civilian political control easier.

From a military viewpoint, therefore, there are several good reasons not to rush the investment in the militaries of new NATO members. The threat does not demand it. Their economies need to avoid it. Their officer corps cannot be easily rushed into it. And their emerging fragile democracies could be endangered by it. Finally, NATO has taken in members without demanding rapid military integration. Spain is the latest case, and several charter members delayed serious military modernization for many years.

The important thing about being in NATO is the requirement it places on members to become democracies with market economies and to abandon traditional power politics versus all other members. NATO has transformed the nature of inter-state relations within its borders. Expanding NATO into Central Europe should have as its primary aim the imposition of these changes in that region.

Next, let me turn the impact of NATO expansion on Russia. Objectively it is in Russia's interest. A return to competitive diplomacy and power politics in Central Europe can hardly be an advantage to Russian economic development or to its struggle to achieve democracy. All the rhetoric coming from Moscow to the contrary, this is the reality. The anti-NATO expansion talk in Moscow has far more to do with Russian domestic politics than with objective Russian interests. If the neo-imperialist politicians in Moscow continue to succeed in making us too timid to expand NATO, their credibility will grow, as it has over the last three years. Had we already expanded NATO, they would have been discredited, and liberal-minded officials like Andrei Kozyrev would probably still be in office.

We should reflect on the propaganda we heard from Moscow when we deployed our INF units in Europe in the early 1980s. It was loud, but it moderated when we actually deployed the missiles. It will not be different today after NATO is expanded. But does this mean that we should simply ignore Russia in matters of European Security? No, quite the contrary.

Let me repeat a proposal I made a year ago. As we expand NATO, we should propose to Russia that OSCE create a "security committee" composed of Russia, Ukraine, Germany, France, Britain, and the US, and even perhaps Italy. The committee should have the power to act militarily to maintain peace in

Europe when a consensus to do so exists among the members of this security committee. This would give OSCE the potential to construct an effective all-European security system – from the Atlantic to the Urals. It would provide Moscow an opportunity to act constructively as Europe's largest state.

If it chooses not to act constructively, then we can fall back on NATO and its new policy for "out of area" operations. When Russia acts constructively, as it has in joining the IFOR in Bosnia, then NATO forces with Russian forces can deal with military challenges together. This approach strikes me as far preferable to the various proposals for giving Russia a special link to NATO, a second-rate seat near, but not in, NATO.

We also need to engage Russia more actively in dealing with the potential reunification of Korea. In 1990, the Soviet foreign ministry proposed a four power group, the Soviet Union, China, Japan, and the United States, to deal with Korea. Unfortunately, we rejected the offer. We should revive the idea. Russia is already participating to some degree in the G-7. If market reforms make significant progress in Russia, along with democracy, then full membership is appropriate.

These three steps – an OSCE security committee, a four power group for Korea, and opening the G-7 to Russia – would provide Russia with substantive participation in regional and global affairs fitting its status as a great power. These steps would undercut the charges that NATO expansion will lead to Russia's isolation. We do not want that, and we can expand NATO without forcing isolation on Russia. The choice, of course, would finally be up to Moscow.

As a last point, I do not want to leave the impression that NATO expansion will be easy, a trouble-free step. It will not. Countries not initially included will be a problem, particularly the Baltic states but also Slovenia, which has every justification for being included, and Ukraine, Slovakia, Romania, and Bulgaria. Finland has recently been flirting with the idea asking to join NATO. And at some point, Austria and Sweden may ask to join. Even among the small set of initial members, domestic developments in those states could prove embarrassing and difficult for NATO. And, of course, there are financial costs, even if not large.

One can dream up some troubling scenarios based on these potential difficulties. I do not deny that they could arise. Rather I consider the alternative of failing to expand NATO. The troubling scenarios that could emerge from that policy are far more dangerous.

Thank you for your attention.

**STATEMENT OF FRANK KOSZORUS, JR.  
HUNGARIAN AMERICAN COALITION**

**for the**

**CENTRAL AND EAST EUROPEAN COALITION  
HOUSE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS COMMITTEE**

June 20, 1996

Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, I am pleased to be with you this morning to discuss the importance of NATO enlargement and to express the Central and East European Coalition's ("Coalition") support for H.R. 3564, the NATO Enlargement Facilitation Act of 1996, (and the companion S. 1830), which will facilitate the enlargement of the Alliance and serve vital geopolitical interests of the United States.

The Coalition comprises 18 national grassroots organizations representing 22 million Americans who trace their heritage to that part of the world.

The Coalition strongly believes that the long-term national security and fiscal interests of the United States require a strong commitment to the transition of Central and East European countries to fully democratic and free market nations. That commitment requires an active United States engagement in that part of the world.

The Coalition further believes that peace, stability, and democracy throughout Europe serve the national security interests of the United States. In this century, the United States was called upon to fight two world wars and a 45-year Cold War -- conflicts which emanated from the heart of Europe -- in the furtherance of those vital geopolitical interests. Both the institutionalization of democracy and market economies in Central and Eastern Europe and the prevention of any large power dominating any part of Europe are the best means of guaranteeing that there will be no further European conflicts which will entangle the United States. We believe that with the collapse of communism and the Soviet Union, the objectives of peace, stability, and democracy in Europe are achievable. Success, however, requires continued engagement, support, and assistance of the United States and the West.

Since the signing of the Camp David Accords, the United States has wisely supported the peace process in the Middle East. That long-term commitment is now paying dividends with increased stability throughout that region of the world. Similarly, the strengthening of democracy and market economies in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe will require a long-term commitment by the United States. Forty-five to seventy-five years of communist oppression and tyranny cannot be supplanted overnight.

Continued United States engagement in Central and Eastern Europe must take various forms. Among the most visible is our involvement in the security issues of the region. We believe that the general stability and security of the region can best be accomplished

through the expansion of NATO to include all the nations of the region who desire to join the alliance and meet the criteria for membership. For that reason, we strongly support H.R. 3564.

The Coalition endorses H.R. 3564 because it addresses the heretofore glacial pace of NATO's expansion. The collapse of the Soviet Union has left a dangerous security vacuum in Central and Eastern Europe. That region must be rapidly reintegrated with the West to provide it with a sense of security and to shore up the new democracies. Rapid expansion of NATO to include countries which are committed to the concepts of democracy, market economies, civilian control of the military, and human and minority rights would serve this objective as well as the foreign policy interests of the United States by ensuring Europe's overall stability.

In January 1994, the Clinton Administration committed itself to the integration of the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe into the defensive structure of the Atlantic community. More than two years later, the questions posed by the President -- *when* the process of NATO enlargement will begin, and *who* will join -- remain largely unanswered.

Zbigniew Brzezinski presciently observed.

Continued U.S. waffling could also consolidate Russian opposition to any expansion of NATO so that any eventual move to widen the alliance will unavoidably be seen as conveying a hostile message to Moscow. In the meantime, because of that ambiguity, Russian leaders with whom a clear-headed Western plan for NATO's expansion could be constructively discussed are being locked into an increasingly negative posture by the rising crescendo of highly vocal Russian opposition. There is little to be gained and a great deal to be risked by more delay in explicitly answering the question of "when and how."

If the unanimous decision of the sixteen NATO allies and ratification of their respective parliaments are to be achieved when the alliance finally begins to consider new members, the United States must now take the initiative and unequivocally express its commitment. H.R. 3564 begins this process and recognizes that the United States must focus its priority attention on Central and Eastern European countries. Success in their transition to pluralism and democracy will validate the many sacrifices we made to win the Cold War. The United States also should continue to assist those countries of the former Soviet Union that have made a demonstrated commitment to free market policies. Failure will ensure a new world order far less congenial to our interests.

As noted in his most recent article, published in Newsweek on June 17, 1996, Henry A. Kissinger notes that ambivalence concerning NATO enlargement,

threatens to create a gray zone in Eastern Europe between Germany and Russia, potentially tempting historic Russian drives to create political and

strategic vacuums around its periphery.

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NATO expansion requires a decision, not a study; its absence will tempt an even further thrust to expand Russia's strategic frontiers.

The adverse consequences of our withdrawal from Europe at critical times in the past fill history books. Had the United States reacted firmly to the turmoil threatening peace in Europe prior to the First and Second World Wars, many American lives and resources would have been spared. Similarly, the Cold War would have been far less expensive and dangerous had the United States not pulled back from the heart of Europe and had we resisted domestic pressure to "bring the boys home" before the European political order had been settled. As George F. Kennan wrote in 1950, "history does not forgive us our national mistakes because they are explicable in terms of domestic policies."

Today, we must not permit Central and Eastern Europe to languish in a security vacuum. Russian interests are not threatened by the expansion of a defensive alliance. Moreover, stability and economic growth on the borders of Russia can only benefit Moscow.

Russia should not be isolated and mechanisms, such as a treaty between NATO and Russia or a permanent body to implement security and partnership arrangements on the continent, should dispel any lingering concerns Moscow may entertain about an enlarged NATO. Russia, however, should under no circumstances be permitted to veto NATO's enlargement. Western indecisiveness will encourage Russian nationalists to assert expansionist tendencies and cause the United States and the West to lose credibility. Russia itself is in a fluid state with voices of nascent expansionism being heard with greater frequency.

Moreover, since 1990 there has been no apparent response to Russia's escalating threats relating to the enlargement of the alliance. On the contrary, disquieting developments have exacerbated such threats, including the renegotiated Treaty on the Conventional Forces in Europe which would permit Russia to more than triple the number of deployed armored combat vehicles in the Pskov region on the immediate borders of Estonia and Latvia.

We recognize that the expansion of NATO will proceed in stages. Although this should not result in a division of Central and Eastern Europe into protected and unprotected countries, the process must at long last begin. NATO should remain open to states emerging from communist domination which are not included in the first stage of enlargement.

In the transition period prior to enlarging NATO membership, the Coalition continues to assert that there are immediate and concrete actions for the United States to take. First, the United States should immediately propose to NATO the designation of countries that will be invited to join the alliance through a gradual enlargement, and establish a clear timetable for this process. Second, bilateral military cooperation should be significantly expanded under the Partnership for Peace and other programs. The United States should

assist these countries in developing appropriate self-defense strategies and in restructuring their armed forces accordingly. Third, the United States should provide assistance, including surplus U.S. defensive articles, to the regional military cooperative peacekeeping initiatives among European countries emerging from communist domination to enhance their capability to provide for security and stability and to contribute towards international peacekeeping efforts. Finally, NATO should firmly express its commitment to the independence and territorial integrity of all democratic and sovereign European states.

Continued Western hesitation in enlarging NATO and in failing to respond to Russian threats will redraw the lines imposed by Stalin and signal Russian imperialists that they, in fact, enjoy a "sphere of influence" in Central and Eastern Europe. The consequences of inaction would be contrary to U.S. geopolitical interests in a stable, secure, integrated, and democratic Europe. Indeed, irrespective of who wins the runoff elections in Russia, the United States must not dismiss the frequent calls of many Russian leaders to reestablish the Soviet Empire.

If only to avoid being drawn back into exacerbated controversies, the United States should not ignore the challenges posed by Central and Eastern Europe. Enlargement of NATO to include countries which desire to join the alliance and meet the criteria of NATO membership is an inexpensive, yet vital insurance policy for the United States.

H.R. 3564 and its Senate counterpart are welcome first steps in this direction. We commend Chairman Gilman, and the other members of the Committee, for their leadership in introducing this important bill. We hope this bill will receive substantial bipartisan support in both chambers, as well as support of the President.

These bills must be followed by concrete steps, eligibility lists, criteria, and unambiguous timetables for NATO enlargement in 1996-1997. As we approach the 21st century, we simply cannot afford to squander a historic opportunity to safeguard peace and democracy. With vision and leadership, we will not have to pose the question, "who lost Central and Eastern Europe the second time this century?"

**TESTIMONY OF  
RICHARD H. KOSINSKI**

**On behalf of the National Confederation  
of American Ethnic Groups, Inc.**

**Before the**

**Committee on International Relations  
United States House of Representatives**

**Prepared by**

**Z. Michael Szaz, Ph.D. National Confederation of  
American Ethnic Groups, Inc.  
Dale F. Denda, Federation of Polish Americans, Inc.**

**Concerning H.R. 3564**

**NATO Enlargement & Facilitation Act of 1996**

**June 20, 1996**

**2172 Rayburn House Office Building  
Washington, D.C.  
District of Columbia**

Mr. Chairman, distinguished Members of the Committee. My name is Richard H. Kosinski, Esq., and I am the Treasurer of the Federation of Polish Americans, Inc., a member organization of the National Confederation of American Ethnic Groups, Inc..

I am here today to endorse wholeheartedly H.R. 3564, NATO Enlargement and Facilitation Act of 1996, as introduced on June 4, 1996 by Chairman Benjamin Gilman and several distinguished Members of this Committee from both sides of the aisle, including Mr. Bereuter, Mr. Gejdenson, Mr. Hyde, Mr. Leach, Mr. Smith, Mr. Torricelli, Mr. Brownback, Mr. Kim, Mr. Gallegly and Mr. King.

May I at this point express our appreciation to Chairman Gilman and the original cosponsoring Members for the splendid work done on this legislation and for including us in the review of this very crucial bill concerning NATO alliance expansion.

The issue is of the utmost importance to the membership of our organization and those others under the umbrella of the National Confederation of American Ethnic Groups, Inc., including eleven American heritage groups from Central and Eastern Europe.

Our unambiguous support of H.R. 3564 is based on the following reasons:

- 1) It is our contention that a security vacuum prevails in the region of Central and Eastern Europe, notwithstanding the existence of the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program. PfP is a vehicle for limited military cooperation and liaison, offering no military guarantees or meaningful military integration. In the words of the late Secretary of Defense, Les Aspin, on December 3, 1993, this policy does not provide for:
  - NATO Article V security guarantees which state that an attack on one member of the alliance is considered to be an attack on all;
  - Automatic membership at a later time for the signatories;

- Anything other than consultations in the event that the security of one of its participants is threatened.

In addition, PfP includes the Russian Federation which is the potential or possible danger to the security of the region.

PfP, as conceived, was at a minimum a placebo for regional fears and, at best, a limited process to increase military cooperation with the regional armed forces by international exercises. This basic definition remains unchanged no matter how intense these contacts become.

2) While we would like to see a number of Central and Eastern European countries to be admitted to NATO, the focus of this legislation and our interest is in *initiating the formal expansion process*.

Although we appreciate the significance of Secretary of State Warren Christopher's Prague speech, of March 20, 1996, for reaffirming the conceptual framework and displaying a heretofore absent political will on the part of the Administration with regard to alliance expansion, *we must state unambiguously that despite those statements, the formal expansion process has not yet been started.*

Starting the formal expansion process, consistent with Articles X and II of the Washington Treaty, requires an official invitation to a, or several of European states which are in a position to promote the principles of the treaty and enhance the security of the North Atlantic area. Such an invitation has not yet been issued, and according to the June 3 statement made by White House spokesman Mike McCurry, the Administration expects NATO to follow a timetable "that 'goes out' through 1996 and 1997, as they look at the question of who *might then become potential* members for the alliance."

It is our belief that H.R. 3564 comes closest to providing the crucial missing element in current U.S. policy by identifying one of the two components which constitute the first step in actually expanding the alliance--namely, the identification of which countries are, today, qualified

to enter into accession negotiations. We urge the Members of this Committee to also address a timetable by which these negotiations are to occur.

3) It is our contention that while such a step would not exclude any other countries of the region, it must be recognized that close historical, political, cultural and economic links exist between the Atlantic community and Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic. Democracy has deep roots in these societies, and one needs only to cite as evidence for this the Polish Constitution of 1791, the first Parliamentary government in Hungary in 1848, and the democratic credentials of the Czechoslovak Republic after 1918. It should also be recalled that the transfer of power and the dates of free elections in these three countries were realized as a result of the momentous "roundtable" negotiations in Poland in Spring 1989, followed by the self-dissolution of the one-party Hungarian Parliament in October 1989, and the "velvet revolution" in Prague in November of that year.

All three governments support their respective accession to NATO and enjoy substantial support toward this goal on the part of their countrymen. They consider themselves part of the Atlantic community and have made substantial progress towards restructuring their economies and societies.

4) We contend that identification of these countries, as this legislation does, and starting the formal accession process would advance the aspirations of other variously qualified states, like the three Baltic Republics, Slovenia, the Slovak Republic, Romania, Croatia and others in the region, for NATO membership, in spite of dire warnings of those who would like to delay alliance expansion indefinitely by employing excuses.

What is more discouraging, not to initiate the expansion process at all, or not being included in the first round?

While it might have been useful as a cautious outreach measure, the PFP process could and will not, of course, be a substitute for the actual accession protocol. Our concerns in this regard are predicated on the following aspects of the current policy:

1) No apparent distinction exists among the 27 countries of PfP, including those named as eligible in this legislation as well as, for instance, Russia and the Central Asian Republics, which have neither expressed interest nor are being considered for first or second tier entry. How can, under these circumstances, PfP accommodate the underlying proposition of NATO expansion?

2) There is a *de facto* linkage between alliance expansion, as distinct from PfP implementation, to events in the Russian Federation despite categorical assurances to the contrary. The question of identifying first tier candidates was and is still being deferred because of the Russian electoral process. This was evident at both the December 1995 and June 1996 meetings of NATO ministers.

Indeed, progress on the present bill and its Senate equivalent continue to be affected by the same factors. It is our understanding that passage might not be secured before the second round of the Russian presidential election, slated for the end of July. Mr. Chairman, we strongly urge a markup of the bill in this Committee and an early floor vote on H.R. 3564.

3) Taking the requisite steps towards initiation of the formal accession process is portrayed as "rushing the issue" by the administration. The record shows that the basic formula of partnership outreach to the states of Central and Eastern Europe, in fact, dates from mid-1991, *or five years ago*, when the North Atlantic Council in its June 6-7, 1991 Copenhagen communiqué outlined the outreach program, "Partnership with the Countries of Central and Eastern Europe." These policy principles, in an expanded form, were adopted by the Administration in 1993 as "Partnership for Peace." [Mr. Chairman, I ask that the June 6-7 NAC Communiqué be inserted into the record as part of this testimony].

Although the NATO Ministerial Council has since repeatedly declared NATO expansion as its policy, senior State Department sources admit that they have *only recently initiated* an intense dialogue with the other 15 alliance member governments in order to forge a consensus as to the who and when of alliance expansion. What, except rhetoric, did they undertake

after the publication of the "Study on NATO Enlargement" in September, 1995, which identified expansion parameters, and the December NATO ministerial meeting?

Under these circumstances, how can Mike McCurry even liken NATO to a country club which could be joined in an afternoon. *Are five years not sufficient to start at least the negotiations?*

Moreover, enunciation of this policy of outreach in 1991 coincides with what has been reported to be a tacit agreement *not* to expand the alliance into Central and Eastern Europe. According to testimony given by former Ambassador John Matlock before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on May 3, 1995, such an arrangement was part of the negotiations concerning German reunification. If in fact the lineage of PfP is associated with that event, as the timing suggests, our uncertainty about the meaning of the delayed start of alliance expansion would grow to alarm.

For these reasons, we regard PfP as utterly insufficient and we urge the Committee and the House of Representatives to enact H.R. 3564 as soon as possible

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

## STATEMENT OF REPRESENTATIVE CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH

## HOUSE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS COMMITTEE

## HEARING: NATO ENLARGEMENT

June 20, 1996

Mr. Chairman, I was pleased to join you as an original cosponsor of H.R. 3564, the NATO Enlargement Facilitation Act of 1996, important legislation -- which enjoys bipartisan support -- designed to move the expansion process ahead in a timely manner. I commend you, Chairman Gilman, for your leadership in advancing security and stability in Europe -- a region of vital interest to the United States.

Regrettably, the Clinton Administration's professed commitment to expansion of NATO has not been matched by concrete deeds. The Partnership for Peace program, meant to deepen and strengthen the links between the Alliance and the emerging democracies of East Central Europe, appears stalled. The NATO Enlargement Facilitation Act is designed to move the program forward, making much-needed resources available to Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and others, helping them to meet the obligations which NATO membership would entail.

The United States must provide the determined leadership necessary to advance NATO enlargement and check those bent on blocking the inclusion of new states in the Alliance.

Mr. Chairman, the peoples of East Central Europe have made tremendous strides in working to overcome the legacy of communism. Many of the countries have undertaken significant steps to consolidate democracy, to protect human rights, and to rebuild their economies based on market principles. At the same time, my endorsement of an expanded NATO is tempered by a recognition that progress on these fronts has not been even. There is room for further improvement in each and every one of the states concerned. I remind my colleagues that all twenty-seven states which have joined the Partnership for Peace to date are participating States of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), meaning that they have committed themselves to act in accordance with all OSCE documents, including the Helsinki Final Act.

As Chairman of the Helsinki Commission, I have witnessed the fundamental role of human rights in advancing genuine security and stability. Protection of human rights must be an integral aspect of the expansion process and the human rights records of prospective candidates for NATO membership deserve close scrutiny. In fact, I would argue that a country's record should be subjected to more -- not less -- scrutiny the closer that country comes to being admitted into full membership in NATO.

The NATO Enlargement Facilitation Act demonstrates our firm commitment to the people of East Central Europe, including those from the Baltic States and Ukraine, as they strive to overcome the legacy of communism and pursue democracy rooted in respect for the rights and freedoms of the individual.

Mr. Chairman, I am particularly pleased that Senior Deputy Assistant Secretary Perina will present testimony today, given his long association with the OSCE process, and I look forward to his testimony.



## PARTNERSHIP WITH THE COUNTRIES OF CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE

Statement issued by the North Atlantic Council meeting  
in Ministerial Session in Copenhagen on 6 and 7 June 1991

1. The long decades of European division are over. We welcome the major increase in the contacts by the Alliance and its members with the Soviet Union and the other countries of Central and Eastern Europe, as they accept the hand of friendship extended by Alliance Heads of State and Government in London last year. We welcome the progress made by the peoples of these countries towards political and economic reform. We seek to build constructive partnerships with them in order further to promote security and stability in a free and undivided Europe which will recognise the political, economic, social and ecological elements of security, along with the indispensable defence dimension. President Gorbachev's Nobel lecture in Oslo yesterday strengthens our belief that this objective is within reach.

2. The changes that have occurred in Europe since 1989 have substantially increased the security of all European states. We have seen the end of East-West antagonism, progress towards democracy, major achievements in arms control, the adoption of the Charter of Paris and the signature of a Joint Declaration of 22 States, whose continuing importance we underline. We note, however, that concerns about security remain in some countries.

3. Our own security is inseparably linked to that of all other states in Europe. The consolidation and preservation throughout the continent of democratic societies and their freedom from any form of coercion or intimidation are therefore of direct and material concern to us, as they are to all other CSCE states under the commitments of the Helsinki Final Act and the Charter of Paris. Our common security can best be safeguarded through the further development of a network of interlocking institutions and relationships, constituting a comprehensive architecture in which the Alliance, the process of European integration and the CSCE are key elements. Emerging frameworks of regional cooperation will also be important. Consistent with the purely defensive nature of our Alliance, we will neither seek unilateral advantage from the changed situation in Europe nor threaten

the legitimate interests of any state, but rather pursue our efforts to ensure that all peoples of Europe can live in peace and security. We do not wish to isolate any country, nor to see a new division of the Continent. Our objective is to help create a Europe whole and free.

4. The CSCE process - and its institutions created in Paris last November - play a central role in expanding the network of cooperative relationships across Europe. It provides a framework within which we will actively seek, as individual Allies and through institutions, including the European Community and the Council of Europe, the development of closer relations with the states of Central and Eastern Europe as they pursue their democratic development. The Allies have a clear interest in the observance of the principles and provisions of the Helsinki Final Act and the Charter of Paris. We remain fully committed to the CSCE as a political process. We have played a key role in its development, and our consultations within the Alliance continue to be a source of initiatives for strengthening CSCE.

5. We are committed to work with the other CSCE participating states in making the forthcoming meeting of Foreign Ministers in Berlin a decisive new step in reinforcing CSCE's role and in consolidating its new institutional component, especially by enhancing its capacity for political consultation. In particular, we will seek to reinforce the CSCE's potential for conflict prevention, crisis management and the peaceful settlement of disputes by appropriate means, such as creating a suitably structured emergency consultation mechanism and strengthening the Conflict Prevention Centre. We seek an architecture for the new Europe that is firmly based on the principles and provisions of the Helsinki Final Act and the Charter of Paris.

6. We will continue with all available means to support reforms undertaken in the Central and Eastern European states to establish democratic systems of government based on the rule of law and the respect for human rights, as well as the related efforts to create modern competitive mar-



ket-orientated economies. We are convinced that, notwithstanding present transitional hardships, it is only on those foundations of political and economic freedom that the legitimate aspirations of the peoples of those states can be met and grave economic disparities increasingly overcome. We support also the wide range of bilateral and regional contacts, treaties and programmes which are developing between our countries and those of Central and Eastern Europe, as well as positive developments in relations between those countries.

7. We reaffirm our wish to see difficulties accompanying political and economic reform in these countries resolved in a peaceful manner and to the satisfaction of all concerned. In this context, we support the expectations and legitimate aspirations of the Baltic peoples. We call on the Soviet authorities to continue to seek through dialogue and genuine negotiations with the democratically elected leaders of the three Baltic republics a negotiated solution based on the principles of the Helsinki Final Act, and on all concerned to exercise restraint.

8. In the context of the developing network of European security relationships, we welcome the success of the initiative taken by Alliance Heads of State and Government last year in London to establish regular diplomatic liaison with the states of Central and Eastern Europe. It has proved its value in fostering new patterns of constructive dialogue and bonds of friendship. President Havel's recent meeting with the North Atlantic Council was an important symbol of the new undivided Europe that is emerging. We look forward to future visits by the leaders of the Soviet Union and the other Central and Eastern European states. To ensure full mutual understanding of legitimate security interests and policies, we intend to develop further our regular diplomatic liaison along the lines foreseen in the London Declaration in fields of interest to the Alliance and its new partners and also to intensify our programmes of military contacts at various levels. These efforts underscore our intention to contribute to the development of peaceful and friendly international relations, consistent with the spirit of Article 2 of the Treaty of Washington.

9. We see the strengthening of our relations with these countries as a process over time, designed to promote both mutual reassurance and increasing close ties. In doing so, the Alliance will contribute to the achievement of the objec-

tives of CSCE while preserving its responsibilities and mechanisms. While pursuing our present programme of high-ranking political visits and regular diplomatic liaison, we are determined to make the best possible use of our resources to give expression to our commitment to an evolving security partnership through the implementation of a broad set of further initiatives, including:

- The organisation of meetings of officials and experts to exchange views and information on security policy issues, on military strategy and doctrine and on other current topics in the security field, such as exchanges of experience in the domain of arms control and non-proliferation and the conversion of defence industries to civilian purposes.
- Intensified military contacts between senior NATO military authorities and their counterparts in the Central and East European states, discussions at NATO Headquarters, SHAPE and major NATO commands with military officers from those countries on matters of mutual concern, and invitations to military officers and civilian officials from those countries to NATO training facilities for special familiarisation programmes, including on issues connected to civilian oversight of defence.
- Participation of Central and East European experts in certain Alliance activities, including those related to NATO's "Third Dimension" scientific and environmental programmes, and exchanges of views on subjects such as airspace management.
- Gradual expansion of NATO's information programmes in the region, support for the discussion of security issues in a democratic context within those countries and invitations to parliamentary, educational and media groups and delegations of young leaders to visit NATO Headquarters.
- Encouragement of greater contacts between Central and East European parliaments and the North Atlantic Assembly, to be agreed among the parliamentarians concerned.

10. On this basis, we are determined that our Alliance shall make its full contribution to the building of stable and durable peace and security in all countries of Europe. We invite all European states to join with us in realising this shared objective.






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
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